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ABSTRACT 
 
NON-MATERIAL SOURCES OF 
TURKISH ARMED FORCES’ POLITICAL POWER: 
A “MILITARY IN SOCIETY” APPROACH 
Biltekin, Gonca 
MIR, Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Ersel Aydınlı 
September 2007 
This thesis is an attempt to understand the non-material sources of Turkish 
Armed Forces’ political power. For that purpose, the thesis looks at theories of 
power and relevant civil-military relations literature and illustrates that the current 
civil-military relations literature employs an institution-based formal decision-
making approach to military’s political power, where non-material sources of 
armed forces political power is mostly overlooked. Moreover, current literature 
presumes the existence of a conflictual relationship between the military and the 
society where interests of the society and the military clash. Therefore, there is a 
theoretical gap which makes it problematic to study armies like Turkish Armed 
Forces, which enjoy a long-term and considerable support from their societies.  In 
order to provide for an answer to such a gap, the thesis develops a “military in 
society” approach and establishes that the political power of the Turkish Armed 
Forces emanates from its distinctive relationship with its society which has 
historical, cultural, social and discursive dimensions. 
 
Keywords: political power, power sources, civil-military relations, Turkish 
Armed Forces, military intervention, military, army, society 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRK SİLAHLI KUVVETLERİ’NİN POLİTİK GÜCÜNÜN  
MADDİ OLMAYAN KAYNAKLARI: 
BİR “TOPLUM İÇİNDE ASKER” YAKLAŞIMI  
Biltekin, Gonca 
MIR, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Danışman: Doç. Dr.  Ersel Aydınlı 
Eylül 2007 
Bu tez, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri’nin politik gücünün maddi olmayan 
kaynaklarını anlamaya yönelik bir çabanın ürünüdür. Bu amaçla, bu tez  güç 
teorilerine ve  ilgili sivil-asker ilişkileri literatürüne bakmakta; mevcut sivil-asker 
ilişkileri literatürünün askerin politik gücüne kurumsal tabanlı bir resmi karar 
alma yaklaşımıyla baktığını göstermektedir. Bu bakış, askerin politik gücünün 
maddi olmayan kaynaklarını büyük oranda gözden kaçırmaktadır. Bunun ötesinde 
mevcut literatür, toplumun ve de askerin çıkarlarının birbirleriyle çatıştığı bir 
asker- toplum ilişkisinin varlığını farz etmektedir. Bu yüzden,  toplumdan uzun 
zamanlı ve dikkate değer destek gören Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri gibi ordular 
üzerine çalışmayı güçleştiren bir teorik boşluk mevcuttur. Bu boşluğa bir cevap 
oluşturmak için bu tez bir “toplum içinde asker” yaklaşımı geliştirmekte ve Türk 
Silahlı Kuvvetleri’nin politik gücünün, toplumuyla arasındaki tarihsel, kültürel, 
sosyal ve söylemsel boyutları olan ayrıcalıklı ilişkisinden kaynaklandığını ortaya 
koymaktadır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: politik güç, güç kaynakları, sivil-asker ilişkileri, Türk Silahlı 
Kuvvetleri, askeri müdahale, asker, ordu, toplum 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
In eighty four years of Turkish Republic’s history, Turkish military has 
made two outright coup d’états in 1960 and 1980, ousted the government by 
sending a memorandum in 1971, and it engineered the removal of an Islamic-
oriented prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, in 1997. Most recently, on 27 April 
2007, at the pinnacle of presidential elections, Turkish military issued a press 
release from its website, which stated that Turkish Armed Forces is ready to 
intervene if the secular nature of the Republic is compromised. The statement has 
been regarded as a clear warning to the government and called as “e-coup”. 
This historical record of military interventions, along with Turkish 
military’s prevalence in political discussions, illustrates that the Turkish military 
still enjoys a considerable political power despite the recent legal and institutional 
changes which aimed at reducing Turkish military’s political power to the level of 
its equals in EU countries. This thesis is an attempt to understand the nature and 
sources of such political power and tries to answer the following questions: “what 
are the sources of Turkish Armed Forces’ political power and where do these 
sources originate from? 
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In the next chapter, power as defined and analyzed by different branches 
of social sciences, mainly sociology and political science, will be discussed in 
order to understand the sources of political power. It will be argued that 
consensual power theories, which argue that the main source of a group’s political 
power is society, can be useful in understanding the political power of militaries 
which enjoy considerable amount of support from the society.  
In the third chapter, theories of civil military relations and the studies 
which focus on the role of military’s power on politics will be analyzed with an 
underlying lens of power approaches they utilize. It will be argued that most 
theories of civil-military relations are based on a formal decision-making view of 
military’s power exercises. As such, they lay emphasis on institutional and legal 
sources of military’s power. The current literature is mostly based on the 
competition between the civilian and the military on attaining more control over 
these sources.  
Due to its institutional focus, the current literature portrays the society as 
a secondary player, which may have no influence independently of the political 
elite. Since society is presumed to side always with the political elite, they employ 
a conflictual view of military’s political power, where interests of the military and 
the society constantly clash. Therefore, the literature suffers from a gap, resulting 
from disregarding the role of the society in enhancing or curbing the political 
power of the military, which makes it problematic to theorize on popular armies 
which receive considerable and long-term support from the society, even in their 
attempts to undermine civilian authority.  
In order to provide a theoretical framework to answer such a gap, a 
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“military in society” approach, which employs a more society-based consensual 
understanding of power, with relevant contribution by the civil-military relations 
literature will be established. It will be argued that the political power of the 
Turkish Armed Forces emanates from the bond that it establishes with the society. 
The society, rather than using its power over military through elected politicians, 
may establish informal bonds through which it may augment or limit the political 
power of the military. 
In order to test the dominant “institutional prerogatives” approach, the 
thesis will also include a chapter on the material sources of Turkish Armed 
Forces’ political power. The fourth chapter will focus on these material sources 
which are legal, economic and judicial sources. In the fifth chapter, the historical 
sources of Turkish Armed Forces political power will be discussed. And in the 
sixth chapter, Turkish Armed forces political power will be analyzed with respect 
to its cultural, social and discursive sources. These sources constitute a three-
layered formation. On the basis, there are military motifs embedded in the culture 
of Turkish society which enable the establishment of a strong bond of 
identification between the military and the society. Secondly, social interaction 
between armed forces and the society on various spheres maintain and enhance 
this bond. Lastly, through discursive practices the military is able to reflect the 
anxieties and expectations of the society.  
In the seventh and last chapter, it will be concluded that the bulk of 
political power of the Turkish Armed Forces originate from its specific interaction 
with the Turkish society which has roots in the culture of the society and society’s 
evaluation of future risks and opportunities. This chapter also includes theoretical 
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implications of a society-based approach to civil military relations and practical 
implications for the Turkish case. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
POWER 
 
 
 
Power is without doubt the oldest, the most central and disputed concept 
of social sciences. Since most of the relations among humans are related to power 
of one sort or another, any understanding of social science should have at least an 
implicit theory of power. Among them, the studies of civil-military relations try to 
find a solution to the paradox of a powerful military that is subordinate to the 
civilian control. Therefore, the main question that informs civil-military relations 
literature can be reformulated in terms of power as “How to curb military’s 
political power while not limiting its force?” In order to give an answer to this 
question, one must first investigate the nature of the power that the military has or 
exercises. Without such an analysis, all theories of civil-military relations will be 
inadequate. 
 In this chapter, I will look at power as defined and analyzed by different 
branches of social sciences, mainly sociology and political science in order to 
arrive at some analytical categories. In the subsequent chapters, these categories 
will help me to assess the power conceptualizations utilized by different civil-
 6
military relations theories in order to understand nature and sources of the 
political power of militaries.  
In this chapter, I will try to find answers to the following questions: Who 
is powerful? Where does the political power of a person, a group, an institution 
originate from? Is power a capacity (sources) or an action (exercise)? Why is 
power exercised? Is a conflict of interests inevitable in a power relationship? 
2.1. THE PROBLEM OF POWER 
Although power is one of the most disputed concepts of social sciences, it 
is probably the concept least agreed upon. Most scholars use it without definition, 
and when they do, it is ambiguous whether they refer to power resources, the 
scope of power or exercise of power. Nevertheless, there is a limited common 
understanding of the term, for otherwise; it might be of no use. This limited 
agreement, according to White, is on the fact that “power is concerned with 
affecting”1 of a significant nature. Parsons calls it “a core complex of meaning”2 
while Dahl and Polsby refer to same core as they argue that power, influence and 
control are “serviceable synonyms.”3 For Russell, power is “the production of 
intended effects”.4 Therefore, power is a diffuse concept, which connotes a 
general capacity to do things irrespective “of the media employed or of the status 
                                                
1
 D.M. White,  “The Problem of Power, ” British Journal of Political Science 2, no. 4 (1972): 481. 
2
 Talcott Parsons, “On The Concept of Political Power,” Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society 107, no. 3 (1963): 232. 
3
 A. Robert Dahl,  Who Governs? Democracy and Power in the American City (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1961) and Nelson Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1963), 3-4. 
4
 Russell Bertrand , Power: A New Social Analysis (London: Unwin Books, 1960), 25. 
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of authorization to make decisions and impose obligations.”5  
Although all scholars may agree on significant affecting as the core 
element of power, not surprisingly, what makes any affecting “significant” is 
controversial and there is no agreement between the scholars with respect to 
definition of power. What is more, the definition of scholars and their own focus 
of study can be different from each other. For example, Dahl prefers to define 
power per se as a capacity, but his focus of study is on “power as an exercise” as 
observed in decision-making arenas.6    
In his study to understand what core elements are necessary to include in a 
definition of power, Debnam analyzes six definitions and distribution of fifteen 
elements among these definitions.7 He concludes that, four core elements are 
needed for a definition of power: actor, action, intention and outcome. When it 
comes to the question of whether power is a capacity or an exercise, he chooses to 
collapse them both under the concept of “action” since power as a potential is 
practically undistinguishable from power as a manifest action. While existence of 
conflict and sanctions are usual in exercises of power, they are not core elements 
for any power exercise can exist without them. Some elements like value, 
asymmetry, compliance and decision are all related to the consequence of power 
exercise, Debnam regards them as “outcome”. Since “it is not possible to study 
power independently” without referring to an outcome, or effect, outcome is a 
inevitable element of any power definition.  
                                                
5
 Parsons,  “On The Concept of Political Power, ” 232. 
6
 Dahl, Who Governs?  
7
 Geoffrey Debnam, The Analysis of Power: Core Elements and Structure (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1984) 
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Despite the difficulties, the main clusters could be identified with regard to 
the questions that scholars of power try to answer.  In the subsequent sections, we 
will try to group theories of power with respect to their answers to questions:  
a. Who is powerful?  
b. Is power a capacity (sources) or an action (exercise)?  
c. Is a conflict of interests is inevitable in any power relationship? 
2.2. WHO IS POWERFUL?  
The first question that arises when thinking about power is probably the 
question of “Who is powerful”. Any student of power is inescapably obliged to 
define who is powerful. An early answer to this question is given by Aristotle: 
Powerful are those “at whose will that which is moved is moved and that which 
changes, changes”8. Yet, in specific circumstances, it is more than hard to 
understand what the will is, whose will it is, and whether the outcome is identical 
with the initial will. 
The answers to the question of “Who is powerful?” can be grouped into 
two. The first group of scholars depicts a certain group of people as the powerful. 
These social groups can be defined with respect to their material well-being, class, 
status, membership to an organization or their position. This first group is known 
as elitist theories of power. The second approach, known as the pluralist theories 
or community power theories, has a more systemic understanding of power, 
where power belies with the whole society, where no permanent power structure 
                                                
8
 Aristotle,  Metaphysics (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1998), 74. 
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exists. But, before dwelling on elitist and pluralist conceptions of power, one 
should look at Weber’s account of power which inspired them both. 
With respect to power, Weber argues that there are three orders which 
make up the modern society: the economic order, the legal order and the social 
order.9 While the economic order is merely the way in which economic goods and 
services are distributed, the legal order is the order established by law through 
which a “specific staff of men who use physical or psychical compulsion with the 
intention of obtaining conformity with the order or of inflicting sanctions.”10 For 
Weber, social order as distinct from economic and legal order is “the way in 
which social honor is distributed in a community between typical groups 
participating in this distribution”11  
In his account of rationalization and bureaucratization of societies, Weber 
argues that the structure of legal order influences the distribution of power in 
society.12 However, it is an additional factor that enhances the chance to hold 
power or honor: but it cannot always secure them. 
Based on Weber’s account of three orders, elitist theory argues that power 
is concentrated on the decision-making elite within a society. According to Mills, 
one of the leading scholars who work within this approach, the most important 
question about power is the problem of who is involved in making the big 
                                                
9
 Max Weber, “Class, Status and Power,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H. H. 
Gerth  and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 180-195. 
10
 Weber, 180. 
11
 Weber, 181 
12
 Weber, 180 
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decisions of national and international life.13 As such, his focus is on the question 
of “who”.  
Mills states that the there are three broad levels of power in a society. At 
the top level there is the power elite composed of the leading men of political, 
military and economic institutions, which he depicts as “the high military, the 
corporation executives and political directorate”14 The people of the middle and 
lower levels of power, according to Mills, play only very minor and limited roles 
in decision-making. Therefore, for Mills although the individual members of these 
three broad levels of  power changes over time, the power structure is rather 
stable, enabling the membership only to those who are successfully socialized into 
their respective institutions.  
Among the three important sectors, Mills thinks, the economic sector has 
the largest power for “the growth of executive government…means the 
ascendancy of corporate elite into political eminence.”15 Especially after WWII, 
the corporate men come to dominate the political directorate. In addition to the 
corporate sector the military sector has gained a decisive political and economic 
relevance at the expense of the politician: “Not the party politician but the 
corporation executive is now more likely to sit with the military to answer the 
question: what is to be done?” 16  
Other theoreticians of power question Mills’ assumptions of the existence 
                                                
13
 C.Wright Mills, “The Structure of Power in American Society,” The British Journal of 
Sociology 9, no.1 (1958): 29. 
14
 Mills, “The Structure of Power in American Society,” 32-33 
15
 Mills, “The Structure of Power in American Society,” 33 
16Mills, “The Structure of Power in American Society,” 33-34 
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and rigidity of the power elite. Pluralist (community power) scholars, state that 
power is diffused within a society. They criticize the elitist conception that ruling 
elite makes key political decisions in a given social group. They argue that 
different groups of people have more influence in making key political decisions. 
These groups are not always the same. Dahl argues that in any society there are 
people more powerful than the others, yet these people do not consequently form 
a ruling elite.17 They argue that there is a group of people who have a potential for 
control, that is, there is high probability for their decisions to prevail, does not 
mean that they have a high potential for unity. When, as Mills argues, leading 
military men and business men, agree on a policy, it is highly probable that that 
alternative will be chosen. Yet Dahl contends that it is wrong to assume that they 
will agree on an alternative, since their interests and preferences are diverse and 
hard to coalescence.18 In other words, for Dahl, despite the great extent of power 
resources at their hand, these leading men cannot form a permanent power elite, 
since they hardly -if ever- have a potential for unity in terms of their preferred 
ways and goals about operationalizing those resources.  
Dahl’s and other pluralists’ conception of power differs from the Mills’ in 
the sense that it does not presume the existence of a single ruling elite. Contrary to 
static and bureaucratic analysis of Mills, they think that the power distribution 
within a society is not a permanent aspect of the social structure. Rather, the 
power that a group successfully exercises is subject to change according to time 
and issue areas. Mills argues that the socialization of the elite within institutions is 
                                                
17
 Robert Dahl, “A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model,” The American Political Science Review 
52, no. 2 (1958): 463. 
18
 Dahl, “A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model,”  464 
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an important aspect of the elite’s unity and he assumes that every member of the 
elite is inescapably indoctrinated through social processes, so that they have 
similar if not identical interests. Dahl and Polsby question this assumption and 
argue that such unity is challenged from time to time and from one issue to 
another. So any permanent power elite which prevails on the key political issues, 
is unlikely.19  
2.3. POWER SOURCES vs. POWER EXERCISE  
The next question about analyzing power is whether to treat power as an 
ability/capacity or as an exercise. If one gives priority to the former, the analysis 
would necessarily lead to question of “having power”: Who has power? Hence, 
the first cluster. Accordingly, if one gives priority to the latter, the research focus 
becomes mechanisms of power exercise, whether they are formal or informal.  
One major obstacle in answering whether power is a capacity or exercise 
is to differentiate between sources of power and power per se without being 
entrapped in describing exercise of it. Indeed, White plausibly argues that there is 
no power as distinct from exercise of power.20 Foucault shares this view and 
argues that power per se does not exist.21 Consequently, those who attempt to 
describe power per se indeed define power sources. Others argue that such 
sources may or may not be translated into political power, thus one should look at 
power exercises, as they are manifestly observed in decision-making arenas.22 For 
                                                
19
 Nelson Polsby, “How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist Alternative,” The Journal of 
Politics 22, no. 3 (1960): 476. 
20
 White, 480. 
21
 Michel Foucault,  “The Subject and Power,” Critical Inquiry 8, no. 4 (1982): 777-795. 
22
 Polsby, Community Power, 121 
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example, a person who is wealthy enough to affect certain political decisions may 
not choose do so; therefore focusing on his/her economic assets may be irrelevant 
in assessing his/her political power.  
In this section, following White and Foucault, I will disregard power per 
se and will look at approaches which focus on either power sources or power 
exercises.    
2.3.1. Power Sources 
 
2.3.1.1. Material Sources of Power 
Marx believed that history is and will be determined by class conflict 
driven by power derived solely from economic resources.23 Marx has seen the 
origins of power in the material substructure and concluded that who has the 
means of production has the power. Therefore, for Marx, the sources of power are 
inherently material.   
Mills also put more emphasis on material sources of power.24 Rather than 
the nature of power that decision-makers have, Mills tries to investigate the 
sources of power they utilize. For Mills, their power essentially stems from their 
position in their respective organizations. The power of these elites rests on the 
high bureaucratization and centralization of the modern societies which provides 
with them the means of power.  Their power emanates from institutional trends by 
                                                
23 Karl Marx, Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan (Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000) 
24
 Mills, “The Structure of Power in American Society,” 29 
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which “the men at the top have been selected and formed”.25 Moreover, their 
formal and informal ways of cooperation and explicit co-ordination enables them 
to realize their converging interests.  
The lower level of power, which is merely composed of the public, does 
not possess the instruments for decision. Contrary to the classic image of 
democracies, where the people are presented with problems, discuss them, 
formulate viewpoints, organize, and compete; in modern societies, the public is 
politically fragmented, unorganized and thus, unable to make decisions. The 
public is “increasingly powerless”26  
Mills approach to power is based on institutions and organizations as 
“means of power”. He states that “In the modern world,… ideas which justify 
rulers no longer seem so necessary to their exercises of power.”27  So power is 
not authoritative. Authority, the form of power that is justified by the beliefs of 
the voluntarily obedient,  
“has less relevance in modern day politics, which 
ceases to be an arena in which free and independent 
organizations truly connect the lower and middle levels of 
society with the top levels of decisions.”28 
Mills’ approach has very little reference to ideas and ideational factors, not 
because that they are not relevant in analysis of power. Rather, he has a practical 
reason: the main channels of communication between organizations and lower 
levels of society, which is crucial for authority, have begun to collapse. In other 
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words, since channels for social interaction cease to function, forms of power like 
authority, which originate from ideational sources, have lost their prevalence. 
2.3.1.2. Ideational Sources of Power  
Weber does not agree with Marxian materialist understanding of power 
and argues that the power as such is different from “economically conditioned” 
power. Power can be derived from social and cultural sources, as well as from 
economic situation. Indeed, he argues that even economic power may be the 
consequence of power existing on other grounds.29  
Weber states that ‘class’ which is described according to the material well-
being of the group, is not the only phenomena of power distribution within a 
community. He introduces the concepts of ‘status groups’ and ‘parties’ as 
additional ways to stratify society and to understand the power distribution.30  
Parties are groups of people who came together with the aim of 
influencing a communal action no matter what its content may be. Rather than 
enjoying a similar source of power, parties are groups of people, coming from 
different status groups or classes, who strive for power.  
In contrast to parties, ‘status groups’ is based on a specific source of 
power: in status groups, the power distribution is based on social estimation of 
honor. Those who belong to the same status group share a specific style of life. As 
such, social honor may be informed by the material condition of the person in 
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question. Yet, Weber states that propertied and propertyless people can belong to 
the same status group, who share an equality of social esteem.  Therefore, wealth 
is not a prerequisite for having social honor. The real source of the power of a 
person is the opinion of the other people as to how much social honor that person 
deserves. Therefore, in Weber’s account, honor operates as a form of ideational 
source of power, which is established during social interaction and rooted in the 
perceptions and attributions of others. For Weber, “an occupational group” -like 
military for example- is also a status group, since “it successfully claims social 
honor only by virtue of the style of life which may be determined by it”31 
Another approach, which focuses on the sources of power, is by Hannah 
Arendt, who finds the sources of power in ideational phenomena. According to 
Arendt, “power cannot be measured in terms of wealth.”32 Nor she thinks that 
power arises from other physical phenomena that may be converted into 
instrument of violence. Contrary to Marx and Weber who regarded violence as the 
ultimate form of power upon which the government rests,33 she states that 
violence is the opposite of power. 34 Indeed, she establishes her theory of power as 
diametrically opposed to the concept of violence. 
For Arendt, the power “can only be actualized but never fully 
materialized”35 since it is not “an unchangeable, measurable, and reliable entity.” 
Therefore, it has an ideational character, which exists as a potential.  
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For Arendt, power is the capacity of the people to act in agreement. As 
such, power is in inherent in the very existence of political communities. While 
violence is a means to an end and always requires the justification of it, power is 
an end in itself. It is “the condition enabling a group of people to think in terms of 
the means-end category”.  
The core element of power for Arendt is support of the people. She states 
that it is the people’s support and the continuation of the societal consent that 
brought the laws into existence that lends power to the institutions of a country.” 
For Arendt, a republic is where “the rule of law resting on the power of people, 
would put an end to the rule of man over man”. Mills assumption of the obedience 
and indifference of the masses is challenged by Arendt’s argument that society is 
not simply submissive, on the contrary, due to its active support, it is indeed the 
very source of power that the government and its institutions rests on.   
As emanating basically from the opinion of society, what power needs is 
not justification of an end or promise of a future prospect, but legitimacy: “Power 
springs up whenever people get together and act in concert but it derives it 
legitimacy from the initial getting together, rather than from any action that then 
may follow.” 36 Legitimacy of the power, Arendt argues “bases itself on an appeal 
to the past”, that is to say, the history of the political community. Since legitimacy 
is sine qua non of power, and legitimacy is tied to the past practices of the society, 
power has also a historical source. 
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Arendt points to the fact that power in its pure form is hard to find in 
practice. She states that “institutionalized power in organized communities often 
appears in the guise of authority”, without which modern societies cannot 
function.37 Since authority “requires respect for the person or the office.” respect 
can be regarded as another ideational source of political power. 
2.3.2. Power Exercises  
White argues that any definition of power should answer the following 
question: “What must be added to affecting someone or something for there to be 
an exercise of power?”38 Polsby, define power as “the capacity of one actor to do 
something affecting another actor, which changes the probable pattern of 
specified future events.”39 While his definition of power refers to power as a 
capacity, it is clear that for Polsby, the power holder should do something which 
directly or indirectly affects the power yielder, whether the effect is on his/her 
ideas, status, behavior, material/physical well-being or something else. Not 
surprisingly, Polsby’s own research focus is on decision-making mechanisms.40 
Lıke Polsby, Dahl also concentrates on the negotiations and discussions between 
parties in a decision-making setting, and argues that the one who is able to 
implement his/her initial preferences is the powerful.41 
Bachrach and Baratz, tried to make distinctions between the concepts of 
power, influence, authority and force, and argued that the interchangeable use of 
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power and influence on the one hand and neglect of authority and force on the 
other handicapped scholars of power, in their studies.42  For the former, they hold 
responsible pluralists (Dahl and Polsby) who mostly do not differentiate between 
power, influence and control, since they think they are “serviceable synonyms”. 
While Polsby and other pluralist scholars focus on observable decision-
making mechanisms, Bachrach and Baratz argue that an analysis of “the exercise 
of power” as decision-making is inadequate. They introduce a non-decision-
making approach to power, since “power may be and often is, exercised by 
confining the scope of decision-making to relatively ‘safe’ areas.”43 Referring to 
Schattschneider’s concept of organization as the “mobilization of bias”44 
Bachrach and Baratz proposed to analyze, before dealing with actual decision-
making process, the dominant values and the political myths, rituals that are built 
into the political system in question. They claim that these values, myths and 
rituals are what give real meaning to those issues which enter the political arena. 
This, they call, as the second face of power: 
“Power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to 
creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional 
practices that limit the scope of the political process to public 
consideration of only those issues which are comparatively 
innocuous to A.”45  
The approach which argues that power is also exercised when confining 
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the scope of the decisions, has taken into account more general aspects of power 
relations in a society where not only formal but also informal ways of exercising 
power are at play. The power to shape and reconstruct the myths and values of the 
society indicate that prior to utilization of material sources or institutional means 
of power, which show itself in concrete decision making mechanism, ideational 
processes of exercising power define the context of decision-making.  
Another approach which focuses on non-behavioral ways of exercising 
power is that of Steven Lukes, who criticizes the behavioral assumption of Dahl 
and Polsby. He states that Bachrach and Baratz made a positive move in depicting 
more subtle ways of exercising power.46 Yet, their approach is bound by their 
focus on concrete decision-making situations and the outcomes of the discussions 
thereof.   
Lukes introduces an interest-based approach according to which not only 
behaviors of the power yielder and outcomes of the decisions but also the very 
interests of the power yielder are shaped by the power holder through power 
exercise. This is, for Lukes, “the supreme exercise of power” which is “to get 
another or others to have the desires you want them to have -that is, to secure their 
compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires.”47 He argues that the fact 
that there is not an overt conflict between the parties will lead to ruling out the 
possibility of false or manipulated consensus.  As such, his approach to power is 
radical one, where interests of the power yielder is harmed even he/she may not 
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be aware of it.  
Is it not the most insidious exercise of power to prevent 
people to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping 
their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that 
they accept their role in the existing order of things either 
because they see no alternative to it or because they see it as 
natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely 
ordained and beneficial?48 
  
While Lukes’ approach to exercise of power is relatively free of 
shortcomings that is related to confinement of power exercise to behavioral 
decision-making situations, it is not immune to criticism. For example, Hay 
argues that the main problem with Lukes’ formulation of the exercise of power is  
…the deeply condescending conception of the social 
subject as an ideological dupe that it conjures. Not only is this 
wretched individual incapable of perceiving his/her true interest, 
pacified as s/he is by the hallucinogenic effects of bourgeois (or 
other) indoctrination.49  
Despite the methodological problems in identifying where the conflict lies 
in a power relationship, most -but not all- theoreticians of power regard it as an 
indispensable element of the definition of power. In the next section, I will try to 
analyze these two approaches to power.  
2.4. CONSENSUAL vs. CONFLICTUAL THEORIES OF POWER   
Another question to answer in analyzing power is whether a power 
relationship necessarily involves a conflict of interests and preferences. While 
conflictual view of power focuses on “power over” and thus structures the power 
                                                
48
 Lukes, 24 
49
 Colin Hay, Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 179. 
 22 
relationship as one that exists between the power holder and power yielder, the 
consensual power theories focus on “power to do something” and depicts the 
power relationship as one that exists between the .empowered and empowering. 
2.4.1. Conflictual View 
Most of the theoreticians of power mentioned so far, portray power 
relationship as conflictual, where the interests of the parties in question clash. In 
contrast to Debnam’s argument that a conflict of interests or preferences is not 
inevitable in a power relationship, the conflictual view stresses that when there is 
no conflict between the parties, the relationship ceases to be a power relationship. 
For example, pluralists like Dahl and Polsby argue that in order to investigate the 
differences in influence, there should at least be two groups with different initial 
preferences about a key particular issue. In their search for analyzing cases of 
significant affecting, they set the criterion as significance of issues for the parties 
for selecting the cases. For pluralists the criterion for identifying whether an issue 
as significant are as follows: The researcher should be able to demonstrate that the 
issue areas are “very important in the life of the community”.50 Dahl contends that 
Mills analysis, which depicts a powerful elite and an indifferent mass (whose 
interests clash but not in an overt form) is inadequate in the sense that the 
existence of an indifferent mass implies that the issue at hand cannot be described 
as an important one. Nevertheless, he’s able to foresee a possible criticism of his 
position. In the case of so powerful elite (hegemonic) elite that has the ability to 
shape the ideas, attitudes and opinions, a kind of “false consensus” could be 
                                                
50
 Dahl, “A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model,” 463-469 
 23 
established. This can be achieved through manipulated and superficially self 
imposed adherence of broad sections of a community to the norms and goals of 
the elite. Dahl responds to this possible criticism by arguing that when interest 
and goals of the elite are adhered by the mass, it will be impossible to differentiate 
the elite and the mass, and consequently a power elite ceases to exist.51 
Bachrach and Baratz also identified the power relationship as inherently 
conflictual. The conflict between the parties may be overt, which can be 
perceivable in their disputes within concrete decision-making settings, but it can 
also be veiled, when power holder is able to silence the power yielder, and limit 
the agenda to the issues deemed as safe by the power holder. 
Like Bachrach and Baratz, Lukes stressed the importance of less overt 
forms of confliction, in which even the interests of the power yielder is shaped by 
power holder in order to preempt overt confrontation. In the end, grievances by 
the power yielder against power holder are eliminated from occurring; there is no 
apparent collusion between the parties. Yet, according to Lukes, their “true” 
interests clash. 
2.4.2. Consensual View  
The consensual view focuses on collective action and perceives power as 
the capacity to make a communal action. As with the conflictual view, we find 
origins of this view in Weber’s writings on power, status and society.  
For Weber power is “the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize 
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their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are 
participating in the action.” Debnam argues that this definition of power does not 
necessarily include a conflict of interest between groups of men who strive for 
power.52 On the other hand, scholars like Presthus53 contend that this definition 
necessarily implies the existence of a conflict of interests.  
Torbert, as opposed to classical understanding of “balance-of-power”, 
which eventually rests on competition and conflict between the parties, offers a 
“power of balance” theory, where the power of balance refers to capacity “to 
create a whole without obliterating differences and to balance wholes of different 
kinds.”54   
For Torbert, unilateral force, which is simply the power to succeed in 
exercising one’s own will, is the least effectual and least legitimate power form of 
all, while power of balance, which is based on consent and reason, is self-
legitimizing. 
Power of balance can also be regarded as “mutual power” which “can be 
exercised to balance oneself in relation to others and to cultivate the capacity for 
such mutual self-balancing.”55 Since the power of balance “…invites mutuality 
and empowers those who respond to this invitation with initiatives of their own” it 
is a consensual power, which ultimately rests on the support of the power yielder.  
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As a sociologist who focuses on the factors which hold society together, 
Parsons argues that “power is the ability of a society to do”. He prefers to “treat 
power as a specific mechanism, operating to bring about changes in the action of 
other units, individual or collective, in the processes of social interaction.”56 As a 
product of society the “actorness” of the agent is presumed by society through 
enabling him/her with the power it produces. Therefore Parsons’ theory is a 
systemic theory of power which assumes that power is socially not only 
distributed but also produced. For Parsons, power in polity is analogically 
comparable to money in economy, the circulating medium upon which the polity 
can be based. Therefore, Parsons’ focus is on the circulation and production of 
power, but not necessarily on distribution.  
In politically underdeveloped societies the main means of securing the 
compliance of others is through force. With the development of a more complex 
system the need to ensure effectiveness is greater and deterrence of force becomes 
less and less significant compared to the symbolic value of such power. Parsons 
even states that “the threat of coercive measures, or of compulsion, without 
legitimation or justification, should not properly be called the use of power at 
all…”57 This symbolic value of power is based on its productive capacity and the 
confidence of the society in the ability of the polity to fulfill certain needs, i.e. 
effectively contribute to the attainment of collective goals.58  
Arendt, like Parsons, has a consensual view of power and focuses on the 
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“power to do something” rather than “power over somebody” and argues that 
power  
…corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to 
act in concert. Power is never the property of an 
individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence 
only so long as the group keeps together. When we say 
of somebody that he is 'in power' we actually refer to his 
being empowered by a certain number of people to act in 
their name. The moment the group from which the 
power originated to begin with (potestas in populo, 
without a people or group there is no power), disappears, 
'his power' also vanishes.59  
As such, Arendt’s understanding of power is different from the previous 
theories where there is an inevitable clash of interest between the actors in 
question, and where the exercise of power involves threatening or damaging 
another’s autonomy, and thus domination. Arendt’s formulation of power rejects 
any form of relation that includes some sort of domination. So for Arendt, force, 
strength, coercion and manipulation are not forms of power, because they all 
include relations of domination. She rejects the claims of those who argue that 
relations of power essentially rest on a command-obedience relationship and that 
it necessarily involves a conflict of interests. In contrast, Arendt’s understanding 
of power is based on the principle of equality and the ability of acting and 
speaking together. It works through a process of argumentation.60 
Power is actualised only where word and deed have not 
parted company, where words are not empty and deeds are not 
brutal, where words are not to veil intentions but to disclose 
realities and deeds are not used to violate and destroy but to 
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establish relations and create new realities.61  
Arendt, as explained in the previous section, conceptualizes power as 
something having inherently social resources, which is based on the support and 
cohesion of a group. As such, power is always social and based on social 
interaction, since the power of certain people among a group depends on the 
relationship between the “empowering” and the “empowered”. 
In this chapter I have looked at theories of power and built some 
categories of power. In the next chapter, I will look at theories of civil-military 
relations in order to understand how they conceptualize power of the military. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
MILITARY IN SOCIETY 
 
 
 
The studies of civil-military relations try to find a solution to the paradox 
of a powerful military that is subordinate to the civilian control. In other words, it 
tries to find the possible ways to curb military’s political power while not limiting 
its force. In order to understand these ways, any student of civil military relations 
must -at least implicitly- utilize an approach to the nature of the power that the 
military has or exercises. Therefore, it is plausible to expect that that the theories 
of power presented in the first chapter have a direct connection to theories of 
civil-military relations. The answer to the question of where the political power of 
a nation’s military (in this thesis, particularly Turkish Armed Forces) originate 
from, can be found where these two distinct literatures overlap. In this second 
chapter, in order to provide a framework which would enable me to find an 
answer to my question, I will look at some leading theories of civil-military 
relations with a lens of their underlying approaches to power and try to reveal the 
intersection between the two. 
The civil-military relations problematic rests on two conflicting principles.
 29 
 The first one is that the military must be strong enough to prevail in the society’s 
wars. It exists as a guard against any disaster that the society may face. Thus it  
must be always ready and its strength should be proportionate to the threat that 
challenges the society. Secondly, the military must conduct its own affairs so as 
not to destroy the society it is intended to protect. The necessity that it must have 
coercive power to enforce its will on society’s enemies implies that the same 
coercive power may also be exercised against the society. The possible ways of 
the military’s exercise of its coercive power detrimental to the society are a direct 
seizure of political power (coup); depletion of society’s resources in a quest for 
more power as a hedge against the enemies of the state; involvement of the 
society in unnecessary wars and conflicts by a rogue military or there may be a 
simple concern over the matter of obedience, where the military may resist 
direction or abuse delegated authority in other ways.62  
The civil-military problematic gets complicated, since over time the 
military has come to serve multiple purposes, especially man-power intensive 
programs like disaster relief and construction. It has the ability to redistribute 
wealth through defense budget and coercively change individual attitudes. While 
before, the main concern for scholars and practitioners was to avert a possible 
direct seizure of power by the military, after the collapse of many military 
authoritarian regimes in developing parts of the world, the concern has shifted to
                                                
62 Peter Feaver. “Civil Military Relations” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 211-241 
 30 
 maintain a reliable military under the democratic control of civilians. 
Consequently, less direct ways of military’s exercise of its power has gained more 
attention.  
3.1. CLASSICAL CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS THEORY 
Huntington’s much cited work on civil-military relations The Soldier and 
the State concentrates on the officer corps and rise of professionalism.63 He 
acknowledges the tension between the civilian desire for control over military and 
the requirement to retain the military force to ensure the country’s overall 
security.  
From American experience, Huntington draws two forces, which shape the 
distribution of power between civilian and military elites. The first one is 
“functional imperatives” which are related to the level of the external security 
threat.64 When the level of external threat is high, the military enjoys more power, 
due to the increase in their importance in dealing with such a threat.  
The second force which affects the amount of power that military enjoys is 
societal imperatives, composed of “the social forces, ideologies and institutions 
dominant within the society.”65  
Societal imperative has two main components: prevailing world-view 
(ideology) within the society and the legal-institutional framework. In American 
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case, where the ideology of the society is liberal individualism, the military does 
not enjoy as much societal support as it would enjoy if it were realism.66 
Therefore, the ideology of the society is important in determining how much 
power a nation’s military may exercise.  In other words, societal support, which is 
function of society’s ideology, operates as an ideational source of military’s 
political power.  
The second component of societal imperatives, legal-institutional 
framework, also affects the power of the military through determining its place 
within the internal hierarchy of state apparatus.67 Thus, in Huntington’s account, 
military’s ability to translate its force into political power depends on both 
ideational factors and material factors. While legal-institutional framework 
operates as the material source of military’s political power, ideology operates as 
the ideational source. 
Huntington’s answer to the question of how to ensure military obedience 
has also two components. First one of them is “subjective control” that is, to 
assure that those who share the same political ideology with the civilians hold 
important military posts.68 Through aligning the military with the political 
ideology of the civilian elite, civilians may ensure that military will obey their 
directives. Nevertheless, Huntington does not favor this option, since it may lead 
to excessive civilianization of the military, which will reduce the military’s 
strength in countering threats, and thus state’s military security.  
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The key to Huntington’s favorite option to control military “objective 
control”, is to maintain military professionalism. He defines elements of objective 
control as civilian recognition of autonomous military professionalism and respect 
for independent military actions. When the institutional borders between military 
and civilian spheres of expertise are effectively delineated, Huntington predicts 
that “a highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of 
any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state”.69  
Huntington’s analysis is rich in both ideational and material factors that 
help to understand the sources military’s political power. Moreover, he underlines 
the importance of the ideational bond between the society and the military, which 
may both enhance and limit military’s political power. Nevertheless, he assumes 
that society’s world-view will be shared by the elected politicians, and if 
“subjective control” is exercised, he argues that it would have a negative effect on 
the civilian-military balance of power which would eventually put the security of 
the country in jeopardy due to excessive politicization of the military.  As such, he 
does not perceive society as an independent actor, who may seriously affect the 
political power of military. Rather, his analysis is based on a two-actor model, 
where society and its worldview may affect the military’s power only through 
elected politicians. As such, in Huntington’s picture, the most powerful actor is 
the political elite.  
Like Huntington, Alfred Stepan, in his book “Rethinking Military 
Politics”, focuses on the military as an institution, its corporate interests and 
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influence in the Brazilian politics from 1964 to 1985.70  
According to Stepan, the military’s political power has two dimensions: 
the dimension of military’s articulated contestation to the policies of the civilian 
regime and the dimension of military’s institutional prerogatives.71 These 
dimensions together portray the relationship between the civilians and the military 
in a country.  
Inspired by a Dahlian conception of power,72 Stepan argues that the degree 
of articulated military contestation is affected by whether or not there is a conflict 
of interests between the civilian elite and the military over ‘key political issues’. 
Following the pluralist conviction that these ‘key issues’ should be identified 
prior to any analysis of power, Stepan defines these key issues as: the policies 
over the human rights violations committed by the military, government’s 
initiatives over the organizational mission, structure and control of the military 
and military budget.73 As such, all ‘key issues’ are military issues, pertaining to 
decision-making areas whose immediate and foremost affect is on the interests of 
the military as an institution rather than those areas which has a nation-wide 
importance, like issues of national security, foreign policy or economic and social 
policy. However, in developing part of the world, the military is mostly criticized 
because of its interference in purely political matters, which reside under the 
civilian sphere of decision-making. Therefore, it is rather unrealistic to presume 
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that the army will only contest over policies that are expected to have a direct 
effect to military’s corporate interests.         
Stepan also notes that when he uses the word “articulated” he does not 
mean that military’s contestation is publicly stated.74 Rather, he deems sufficient 
that the military clearly and persistently convey its contestation so that it becomes 
intelligible to relevant military and civilian political actors. Therefore, 
contestations that are delivered in discussions which are held between military 
elite and the civilian elite behind the closed doors are also deemed as 
“articulated”. This definition disregards the importance of the public/societal 
reaction and/or support to the positions of the civilian and military elite in these 
discussions and consequently eliminates society as a political actor which may 
affect the political power of the military.  
The second and most cited dimension of the military’s political power 
found in Stepan’s work is the scope and level of military’s institutional 
prerogatives in:   
…areas where, whether challenged or not, the 
military as institution assumes they have an acquired right 
or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective 
control over its internal governance, to play a role in extra 
military areas within the state apparatus or even to 
structure relationships between the state and political or 
civil society.”75  
These prerogatives, according to Stepan, constitute the bulk of sources that 
the power of the military originates from:  
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Are prerogatives power? Yes, if the exercise of these 
prerogatives helps to turn potential issues on the political 
agenda into non-issues, if their existence sets boundaries to 
political conflict in the polity, if their existence facilitates 
the appeal to their exercise by civilians who have interests 
to protect and thus want the military to remain strong 
players in the political system or if the strong defense of 
the prerogatives prevents major political initiatives from 
being implemented once they have begun.”76  
 
Stepan makes a full fledged definition and he bases his in analysis on both 
de juro and de facto prerogatives of the military. He states that the most important 
potential military prerogatives are constitutionally sanctioned independent role of 
the military in preserving internal law and order, military’s relationship to the 
chief executive, coordination of the defense sector, active duty military 
participation in the cabinet, role of legislature in military budget, role of the 
military in implementing national security policy, in intelligence, policing, 
military promotions, state enterprises, and the legal system.77  
Although Stepan acknowledges that “A dynamic, contextually sensitive 
analysis… entails the assessment of power relationships between three interactive, 
but conceptually distinct, arenas of the polity: civil society, political society, and 
the state” 78 his analysis falls short of entailment. He employs an agent-based 
approach to military’s political power, where most of the time military and its 
corporate interests are at the focus to the expense of civilian elite and the 
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citizenry. At other times, he tries to grasp the nature of the interaction between the 
military and the civilian decision-making elite, almost totally disregarding the 
wider society. However, as seen in the previous chapter, it is equally probable that 
the societal support may be crucial in understanding the nature and level of 
military’s political power.  .  
Following Stepan, Pion-Berlin looks at the military’s prerogatives, yet he 
differentiates them according to the outcome that military seeks to attain in 
exercising these prerogatives. He acknowledges that the interests and motivations 
behind the actions of the military may not always be detrimental to the interests of 
the civilian elite and the society. For example, he argues that in Latin America, 
military may sometimes be “more interested in carving out a political niche within 
democratic order, than overturning it”.79  
According to Pion-Berlin, the motivations of the military can range on a 
continuum from preserving the integrity of their institution to confronting the 
civilian elite for political domination. Within this continuum of motivations, the 
autonomy of the military takes different characteristics. On the defensive side, 
military has an institutional autonomy where the military’s basic determination is 
to protect its boundaries from outsiders and prevent unwanted interferences. On 
the other side, there is military’s political autonomy, where military is determined 
to “stripe civilians off their political prerogatives and claim these for itself.”80 
Both forms of autonomy, which Pion-Berlin defines as “decision-making 
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authority”, are important dimensions of military’s power.  
In order to understand whether a military institution has defensive or 
offensive motivations, and thus aims institutional or political autonomy, Pion-
Berlin looks at a number of decision-making areas. The military’s 
professional/defensive sphere of power consists of the areas, which include the 
core issues of the military: junior level personnel decisions, military doctrine, 
military education and military reform. The professional/political gray area 
includes issues of arms production/procurement, military budget, defense 
organization and senior level personnel decisions. Lastly, political sphere consists 
of issues of internal security, intelligence gathering and human rights (judicial 
immunities of the military personnel).81     
Despite his careful differentiation between prerogatives of the military in 
terms of military’s purpose in utilizing them, Pion-Berlin’s analysis suffers from 
putting disproportionate emphasis on formal decision-making arenas. Unlike 
Stepan, who regards military’s verbal articulation of its contestations as one of the 
channels which military can exercise its power, Pion-Berlin employs a uni-
dimensional, formal decision-making view of power, where more subtle forms of 
power are disregarded. Indeed, Pion-Berlin points to this lack of scholarly interest 
in less overt forms of military’s power. He acknowledges that the civil military 
relations discipline is based on explanations that dwell on the effects of corporate 
interests of the military institutions on military’s power exercises rather than those 
of their ideological beliefs and perceptions. Therefore, he argues that specialists 
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on this issue lack a perspective on subjective and thus ideational side of the 
military’s power.82  
The “institutional prerogatives” approach suffers from a lack of interest on 
the part of the society. The material and ideational interests, motivations, 
ideological orientations and beliefs of the society and their convergence or 
divergence with those of the military is almost totally disregarded. As such, the 
various forms of relationship that military may establish with the wider society, 
based on the level of such convergence or divergence, and their subsequent effect 
on military’s political power is overlooked.  
As expressed before, the civil military relations theories are normative 
theories, which try to find ways to reach the democratic ideal where military’s 
political power is limited while its strength in countering threats is retained. The 
second generation in the field recognizes this fact and argues that that the 
existence of civilian control of the military may be a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for an ideal. They argue that just “civilian” control is not sufficient 
since such control should also be democratic.83 For example, while Soviet Union 
could be perceived as a state in which civilian control of the military is firmly 
established, yet such was not a democratic control of the military, which requires 
the active participation of the citizenry. Therefore, the classical civilian elite vs. 
military elite dichotomy is not sufficient to understand the complete picture from 
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which the political power of the military originate and in which it is exercised. 
Recognizing the necessity to take into account democratic nature of the 
relationship, Wendy Hunter criticizes the scholarly focus on the military 
institution in civil military relations discipline and argued that the other actor of 
the game, the civilian elite and the democratic environment which surround and 
shapes civilian elite’s capabilities, their intentions, interests and power is mostly 
understudied.84 While previous works focus on the aspects, structure, prerogatives 
and/or power of the military as an institution, Hunter focuses her research on 
civilian elite and its relationship with the citizenry.  
She argues that in democratic or democratizing societies, the political elite 
have a strong incentive to curb the political power of the military: to win the 
support of the electorate.85 She gives Brazil as an example where politicians under 
unrestrained electoral competition, have sought to embrace popular causes and 
distribute patronage.  
Hunter makes a contribution to the literature not only by focusing more on 
the civilian elite, but also by going further than simple civilian elite vs. military 
elite dichotomy and including the society -the electorate- to the picture. She 
establishes an electoral-dynamic hypothesis and focuses on civilian elite’s interest 
in attracting mass support on the one hand and military’s interest in containing 
mass mobilization on the other. Therefore, she may be said to establish a three-
actor model at which relative power of the civilian and military elites are shaped 
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by their respective relationships with the society. In her analysis she demonstrates 
that initial institutional prerogatives of the military is not sufficient to account for 
a decrease or increase in the political power of the military, since the maintenance 
of these prerogatives is a function of the societal support once the process of 
democratization is at play.86 Therefore, any analysis of the military’s political 
power, which solely focuses on institutional prerogatives of the military and 
disregards the societal dimension, will be insufficient.  
Unfortunately, probably due to the selection of countries in her case 
studies, Hunter’s electoral-dynamic hypothesis suffers from the presumption that 
the relationship between the society and the army has a conflictual nature. While 
she adds society into the classical “civilian elite-military elite” dichotomy, and 
bases her analysis on the relationship of the society with the civilian elite through 
democratic elections; she does not dwell into many dynamics that are at play 
between the military and the society. The shortcomings are due to two main 
factors. Firstly, her analysis is based on a uniformly conflictual understanding of 
power, where the interests of the society and the military are at constant conflict, 
making the interplay a zero-sum game. For example, one of the ways that civilian 
elite would increase is through cutting the material resources of the military and 
bribing the electorate. The electorate in return supports the civilian elite at the 
expense of the military. However, this assumption of the mechanistic interplay 
between the society, military and civilian elite may not always hold true, since in 
other circumstances ideational and/or material interests of the society and the 
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military may converge. Following her example, the supposed clash of interests 
may not occur in a country where the army and constant supply of its 
expenditures are deemed crucial for the very existence of the state by the majority 
of the electorate.  
Although Hunter was able to have a more structure-based approach 
through arguing that the relationship of the society with the civilian elite is 
important in limiting the institutional prerogatives of the military, she misses the 
opportunity to understand how military’s relationship with the society may be 
important as well in bolstering military’s political power. Military, like 
politicians, may also establish links with society to gain their political support. 
Therefore, their relationship is not necessarily shaped by a conflict of interests.  
Secondly, Hunter’s analysis suffers from an institutional approach to the 
relationship between the society and the military. Contrary to the fact that there is 
a direct institutional link between the civilian elite and the society through 
democratic elections, there is not such a visible link between the military and the 
society.87 Yet, for example, in those states where military service is obligatory for 
male citizens, there is such an institutional link, which may even prove to be 
stronger than the elections.88 Moreover, more informal types of interaction 
between the society and military are possible in various spheres.  
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Indeed, a formal decision-making approach, based on institutional 
channels of interaction is endemic to political scientists who study civil-military 
relations.89 Rather than questioning why the military is ascribed to have a voice in 
political decisions in the first place, political scientists try to trace the increase and 
decreases in the political power of the military through observing the relative 
prevalence of military’s preferences concerning formal decisions. They focus on 
the issue areas in order to understand whether the military has lost or owned new 
prerogatives. Such an approach distracts them from analyzing the power sources 
of the military, which may be ideational as well as institutional/material. 
Military’s opinion-creating and/or enforcing ability as a source if its political 
power is overlooked.  
Secondly, current literature on civil-military relations relies on an agent 
based model, which misses the more structural dynamics that are at play. Most of 
the time, military’s political power is theorized as if it exists and is exercised 
independently of the social nexus it originates from.  At other times, the civilian 
elite and its role in curbing military political power are more emphasized in the 
form of a principal-agent model.90 Nevertheless, the society and its relationship to 
the military are almost totally neglected. 
Thirdly, even when the military’s relationship to the society is considered, 
it is assumed to be conflictual, where material interests of the society and the 
military clash, dismissing the possibility that the society may be willingly 
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directing its resources to the military, even at times of low external threat. 
Therefore, most political scientists who study civil military relations, 
employ an agent based, formal decision-making approach that assumes a conflict 
of interests when theorizing about military’s political power. This leads to a gap, 
which prevents to theorize about popular militaries, like Turkish Armed Forces, 
and their long-term influence in politics.        
3.2. SOCIOLOGICAL SCHOOL: INLCUSION OF THE SOCIETY 
Sociological school, on the other hand, focuses on societal control over the 
military rather than the civilian elite’s control over military. The leading scholar 
of this school Janowitz rejects Huntington’s claim that the ideal-type division of 
labor between civilian and military is essential to professionalization of the 
military. He argues that in contemporary world the military is unavoidably 
politicized and it became like a constabulary force “when it is continuously 
prepared to act, committed to the minimum of force and seeks a viable 
international relations, rather than victory.”91 As such, military professionalism 
should be dynamic and it should be able to integrate new sociological conditions.  
 Janowitz regards the main problem concerning civil-military relations as 
emanating from military’s material resources of power: “the capacity of the 
military to intervene in the domestic politics derives from its distinctive military 
format: its control over the instruments of violence.”92 Although bearing in mind 
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the military’s changing role and its diversified functions in the modern era and 
their effects on the scope of areas that military engages in, Janowitz claims that 
“the significance of force as the basis from which they exercise their political 
power” should not be overlooked.93 The technology and organization of the army 
is also relevant. For example, an army which is mostly made up infantry 
battalions has the maximum potential to intervene in domestic politics since they 
can be deployed in urban centers and have direct access to the society.  Another 
factor that affects the political power of the military is military’s leadership skills 
in bargaining and political communication. Especially the increase in number and 
importance of the military managers (the professional with effective links to the 
society but who is still concerned with the calculus required for organizational 
and pragmatic dimensions of war-making) “produces greater capacity in the 
profession for involvement in politics”94. These leadership skills are also 
intertwined by unique experiences and assignments in political-military issues.95 
Since such military leaders are more knowledgeable about politics, they are more 
prone to intervene in politics.   
Among the ideational sources of military’s political power are the type of 
social recruitment (social composition), education, professional and political 
ideology, and cohesion of the military.  Janowitz claims that the social origin of 
the military men is of less importance than education in shaping their political 
behavior. For armies that were set up during a national liberation movement, like 
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Turkish Armed Forces, the social composition of the military is heterogeneous, 
but mostly from middle or lower-middle class. As being products of national 
liberation movements, these armies have strong political inclinations. Although, 
social composition itself does not have any substantial impact on the ideology of 
the military, it establishes a strong link between the society and the military. This 
link serves as an important source of support and thus, is one of the ideational 
sources of military’s political power.   
In sharp contrast with Huntington’s inclination to separate military from 
other spheres, Janowitz’s proposal to control military’s political power is to 
integrate military with the society’s common values. This ideational form of 
power that society exercises over the military is achieved through a number of 
ways. Military education is the most important path through which community 
values are inculcated and military is socialized. Through this path, the military is 
civilianized: “…the trend in modern society –both in new nations and old- is 
toward a greater penetration of military into the civilian”. For Janowitz, once a 
more dynamic and strong link is established between the society and the military, 
the military as well as the society would be empowered for he argues that 
“Civilianization is other side of the growth of power of the military.”96 
The empowerment of the military through civilianization should be 
distinguished from excessive political empowerment of the military at the expense 
of civilian. Due to the disagreements and diversification on the use of the concept 
of power, these two types military empowerment which are expected to produce 
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opposite consequences can easily be confused. For Janowitz, while empowerment 
through civilianization supports greater civilian (societal) control of the military, 
the second type of empowerment deteriorates it.  
Apart from the difference between their preferred ways to control military, 
the main distinction between Huntington and Janowitz is about their 
conceptualization of the power-holder and the power yielder. Janowitz’s focus of 
study is societal rather than civilian control of the military in contrast with 
Huntington. While Huntington makes a dichotomy of military versus civilian 
elite, Janowitz structures it as military versus society. As such, similar to Arendt’s 
conceptualization of power, Janowitz theorizes society as the actual power holder, 
who both empowers military and is able to control it, while for Huntington the 
main power holder is military since the change he proposes for successful control 
of the military is on the side of the civilian elite. It is the civilian elite from whom 
the military expects a more respectful stance toward its ideological and 
institutional autonomy.  
Janowitz’s emphasis on the convergence of the military and the society 
found resonance in Schiff’s concordance theory. While classical theories of civil-
military relations propose institutional separation of civilian and military domains 
for preventing military intervention, she argues that three actors, the political elite, 
the military and the citizenry can agree and act in concordance on a number of 
issues, which may or may not involve institutional separation of official civilian 
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and military domains.97 Thus, her theory does not depict any civil-military 
relationship as the most desirable, leaving the organization of the relationship on 
the agreement of three actors.  
The relationship between the military and civilians (both elite and the 
mass society) is determined by a set of cultural conditions as well as institutional 
ones. As such, concordance theory “takes into account the cultural and historical 
conditions that may encourage and discourage civil-military institutional 
separation”.98 The centrality of culture and its affect on political and military 
institutions as well as on the society informs the concordance theory. These 
cultural factors include values, attitudes, and symbols inform both the nation’s 
view of its military’s role and the military’s own view of that role.99 Factors like 
“the characteristics of the general population may influence” the role and purpose 
and thus political power of the military. Through referring to the culture within a 
society, concordance theory is able to move beyond classical civilian-military 
dichotomy, by pointing to the links between military and the wider society.  
...concordance theory... argues that three partners-the 
military, the political elites, and the citizenry should aim for 
a cooperative relationship that may or may not entail the 
separation of political and military institutions.100 
Besides,  
Concordance theory operationalizes the specific 
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institutional and cultural indicators…and explains the 
empirical conditions under which the military, the 
government, and the society may agree on separate, 
integrated, or other forms of civil-military relations in order 
to prevent domestic military intervention.101 
Rather than assuming and even prescribing a fully professional army 
which is institutionally and ideologically isolated from the civilian government 
and the society, the decision as how to organize the civil-military relations is left 
to the agreement of the military, civilian elite and the society on four issues: the 
social composition of the army, the political decision-making process concerning , 
recruitment method and the military style.  
Despite the emphasis it puts on non-material factors like culture and 
history and its inclusion of the society into the picture as an active partner in civil-
military relations, the concordance theory has also shortcomings. Firstly, the 
concordance theory can be criticized due to its focus on its prescribed issues of 
agreement: Social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making 
process which “involves the institutional organs of the society that determine 
important factors for the military,” the recruitment method and military style are 
all military issues. What it implies is that when “…agreement occur[s] among the 
political elites, the military, and the citizenry over the political process that best 
meets the needs and requirements of the armed forces”102 the military is satisfied 
and loses its interest in purely political issues so that a military intervention 
becomes less likely. While this expectation of satisfaction and subsequent loss of 
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interest in politics may be true in the case of predatory militaries, it is less 
applicable to those militaries, which are criticized for their involvement in 
particularly political issues such as foreign, social and economic development 
policies of the states. 
Secondly, while concordance theory does not prescribe any specific form 
of separation or integration between military and civilian spheres and rejects 
superimposition of any values upon a nation;103 it prescribes agreement between 
the three actors, in order to avoid a military intervention. Thus, the concordance 
theory has an underlying assumption on the part of interests and opinions about 
the society: any military intervention should be prevented, it is impossible to be 
agreed upon, no matter what the culture, history, risk perceptions, anxieties and 
future expectations of the society are. According to concordance theory, the 
society may agree on anything about military, but not military intervention, since, 
Schiff may seem to think, it is unacceptable and in conflict with the interests of 
the society.  
3.3. MILITARY IN SOCIETY APPROACH 
As illustrated in this chapter, the civil-military relations literature suffers 
from a gap: the current literature is mostly on a formal decision-making view of 
military’s power. In other words, they emphasize the institutional and legal, 
hence, material sources of military’s political power. The current literature is 
mostly based on the competition between the civilian and the military on attaining 
more control over these sources. 
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Secondly, the current literature depicts the society as a trivial player, 
which may have no influence independently of the political elite, on the political 
power of the military. It is depicted as if it can neither empower nor delimit the 
military’s political power. This lack of interest with respect to society is 
attributable to the institutional focus of the current literature. While the formal 
institutional bonds that civilian elite establishes with the society thorough 
elections, and with the military in various decision-making processes are overtly 
visible as they are overly studied, the role of society in civilian-military balance 
and its relationship with the military is mostly left neglected.  
However, with no doubt, an army which does not secure its society’s 
support is fated to fail and perish. It is rather surprising that while society is 
deemed as the ultimate source of political power for the elected civilian 
politicians, the possibility that it may as well be main provider of the source of 
political power of the military is neglected. Society may indeed establish informal 
links with the military.  
Based on the theories of consensual power approach, particularly that of 
Arendt, it is possible to hypothesize that the political power of the Turkish Armed 
Forces originate from the channels it establishes with the wider society. Through 
these mostly informal channels, the Turkish society may both attribute power and 
ascribe a specific role to the military. This attributive understanding of power 
underlies the basis on which “military in society” approach is established. As 
such, according to “military in society” approach, the political power of the 
military is socially constructed as a result of the social interaction between the 
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military and society through time on various spheres. There are historical, 
cultural, social, and discursive dimensions to this interaction.  
The historical sources of military’s political power originate from the past 
experiences of the society with its army. They are important in terms of the 
underlying basis upon which the legitimacy of the military’s political power is 
established. The military’s political power has also cultural, social and discursive 
sources. These sources constitute a three-layered formation. On the basis, the 
existence of military motifs embedded in the culture of the society may enable the 
establishment of a strong bond of identification between the military and the 
society. Secondly, social interaction between military and the society on various 
spheres contributes to maintain and enhance this bond. Lastly, discursive 
dimension is where military is able to reflect the anxieties and expectations of the 
society. 
But before analyzing the sources of Turkish Armed Forces political power 
with respect to these dimensions, with the purpose of testing the dominant 
“institutional prerogatives” approach, which is based on material sources of 
political power, in the next chapter, I will look at legal, economic and judicial 
sources of Turkish Armed Forces’ political power.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
MATERIAL SOURCES OF THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES’ 
POLITICAL POWER 
 
 
 
The material sources of Turkish Armed Forces’ political power can be 
grouped under three headings. First group of material sources are legal-
institutional prerogatives of the army as set in the constitutional system. These are 
also the legal sources of Turkish Armed Forces’ political power. The laws and 
regulations that determine functions, responsibilities and rights of the Turkish 
Armed Forces operate as an almost-material source of political power. These legal 
rules determine the borders of Turkish Armed Forces’ autonomy and its 
relationship with the executive and the legislative as well as other constitutional 
organs.  
The second area is the economic sources of Turkish Armed Forces’s 
political power.  The economic sources are intrinsically related to the legal 
sources since coordination of the defense sector, the share from the national 
budget, the processes of arms procurement are all regulated by legal rules. 
Nevertheless, Turkish Armed Forces’ economic sources also include extra 
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governmental economic sources, like foundations, associations and other non-
governmental establishments that have a role in advancing the economic interests 
of either the military as an institution or the military personnel individually. These 
economic sources can constitute an important element of the material sources of 
the Turkish Armed Forces’ political power as long as their economic activities 
have important affects on overall Turkish economy, which can translate into a 
political leverage against elected governments.   
The third material source of army’s political power refers to the judicial 
status of the army. The extent and coverage of military jurisdiction, its level of 
penetration to areas of political and civil society and coordination of the military-
court-system constitutes this group of sources. While independent military 
judicial systems makes civilian control of the army less effectual and ephemeral, 
thus adding to military’s  political autonomy,  extensive military jurisdiction can 
be used as a tool to project military’s power into civilian domains, changing the 
military-civilian balance of power.    
In this chapter, I will try to group and analyze the above material sources 
of political power with a particular emphasis in their respective weight in the 
overall calculation of Turkish Armed Forces’ political power. I will also try to 
understand the relationship between ideational and material phenomena as to 
understand how they interact and help to produce one another.  
4.1. LEGAL SOURCES 
Most of the work on Turkish Armed Forces and its prominent role in 
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Turkish politics refer to the institutional prerogatives of the army, most of which 
stem from its distinguished legal status in the Turkish constitutional system.  
The most important document that can supposedly provide the Turkish 
Armed Forces with such a legal power base is the constitution. The constitution is 
the main legal document, which sets the constitutive principles along which the 
state organs are supposed to act. Moreover, it defines the functions, duties and 
responsibilities of state organs and their relationship with each other. As such, the 
status of Turkish Armed Forces and its relationship with executive, legislative and 
the judicial bodies are defined in the constitution. 
The constitution of 1982 was drafted and adopted during the period of 
military rule following the September 1980 coup. Since the 1982 Constitution of 
Turkey was prepared under non-democratic conditions it is widely regarded as a 
military constitution.  For this reason, it is often stated that the Turkish 
Constitution of 1982 grants some extra powers to the military.104 It is argued that 
in order to “obtain certain guarantees for a share of power in the upcoming 
democratic system,”105 the military has been able to include some guarantees into 
the constitution, which supposedly entrust them with a “tutelary” role.106 Since 
the limits of these tutelary powers are ill defined, the military can exercise broad 
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oversight over the government and its policies.107 Such empowerment can took 
place in a number of ways. One way was to incorporate military-cherished values 
into the constitution. Özbudun argues that through making references to 
substantive values “such as territorial integrity, national sovereignty, law and 
order, secularism, nationalism” the military can supervise the elected politicians 
and exercise political power.108 Another way is through ambiguous constitutional 
references to the role of the Armed Forces in both the constitution and the related 
laws, giving the army a supervisory role over the policies of the elected 
government with referring to the ambiguously defined national interests. Thirdly, 
the establishment of constitutional formal institutions, (like NSC) can endow the 
military with supervisory powers. 
In this part, I will analyze the place of Turkish Armed Forces in the 
constitutional system under three subheadings. Firstly, I will analyze the founding 
principles of the state as stated in the constitution and their intermingling with the 
above stated “military-cherished values”. Secondly, I will look at functions and 
the hierarchical position of the Turkish Armed Forces as set in the constitution 
and the related laws, with an emphasis on its relationship with primary executive 
and legislative organs of the state. Lastly, I will look at the official national 
security conception in Turkey and the National Security Council and assess the 
overall weight of NSC in defining the civilian-military balance of power.  
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4.1. Founding Principles and the Military 
The constitutive principles in Turkish Constitution of 1982 are stated in 
the preamble and the first eleven articles. In the preamble, it states that the 
constitution has been drawn up according to “the concept of nationalism outlined 
and the reforms and principles introduced by the founder of the Republic of 
Turkey, Ataturk.”109 The preamble also states that the constitution “affirms the 
external existence of the Turkish nation, motherland and the indivisible unity of 
the Turkish state”. The main principles that is stressed in the preamble is 
territorial integrity, secularism, and Ataturkism:   
No protection shall be accorded to any activity contrary to 
the Turkish national interests, the principle of the indivisibility of 
the existence of Turkey with its state and territory, Turkish 
historical and moral values or the nationalism, principles, reforms 
and modernism of Atatürk and that, as required by the principle of 
secularism, there shall be no interference whatsoever by sacred 
religious feelings in state affairs and politics.110 
The values of Ataturkist nationalism, territorial integrity and secularism 
are also restated in the first three (irrevocable) articles of the constitution. Article 
2 of the 1982 constitution stipulates that the Republic of Turkey is a "democratic, 
secular, and social state governed by the rule of law," respecting human rights and 
loyal to the nationalism of Kemal Atatürk and it is “based on the fundamental 
tenets set forth in the Preamble”. Article 3 states that “the Turkish state, with its 
territory and nation, is an indivisible entity”. 
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Because of Ataturk’s primary role in the establishment of the Republic, a 
great importance -along with a wide popularity- is attached to Ataturk by the 
society. Accordingly, the constitutional references made to him and the principles 
like secularism, nationalism, and national sovereignty cannot be solely attributed 
to the military. For that reason, the incorporation of Ataturkism into the 
constitution cannot be perceived as a separate source, rather it may be perceived 
as a clearer illustration of the influence of Atatürk’s legacy not only on the 
military but also on the society.  Moreover, it should be noted that the 
Constitution was approved in a referendum by more than the 90 per cent of the 
voters. This affirms that the incorporation of these values into the constitution has 
been widely perceived as natural by the mass society.  
4.1.2. Functions and Place of Turkish Armed Forces 
Another material source of Turkish Armed Forces’ political power, which 
can be found in the constitution, is the organization of the relationship between 
Turkish Armed Forces and the organs of the state.  
The problem of the Turkish Armed Forces’ place in the constitutional 
system dates back to 1960 military intervention. Due to insistence from the coup-
makers, the Office of the General of Chief Of Staff was placed under the Prime 
Minister with the 1961 constitution, thereby changing the previous practice in 
which s/he operated under the Ministry of National Defense. However, the related 
provisions of Code on Ministry of National Defense and Code on The General 
Staff were still in force, leading to the statements of Constitutional Court, which 
abolished the previous Codes in accordance with the constitution. The 
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constitution of 1982 has been prepared in line with the same principles. 
The Art 117 of the 1982 Constitution states that Chief of the General Staff 
is the commander of the armed forces.  The main duty of the General Chief of 
Staff is to control and command the armed forces, and to determine and 
operationalize the principles and programs regarding the personnel, intelligence, 
mobilization, organization, education and logistics of the military.  Moreover, the 
Office is responsible from managing the military relations with NATO and other 
foreign countries. While the office of the commander-in-chief rests with the 
spiritual existence of the Grand National Assembly and is represented by the 
President of the Republic, at time of war, General Chief of Staff exercises the 
duties of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces on behalf of the President. 
Therefore, the Office of the General Staff is the main constitutional body, which 
represents the Turkish Armed Forces. Consequently, the hierarchical position of 
the Chief of General Staff with respect to other constitutional bodies can provide 
a clue for the place of Turkish Armed Forces in the Turkey’s constitutional 
system. 
The position of the President of the Republic has been a special interest for 
Turkish Armed Forces. The fact that military interventions of 1960, 1971 an 1980 
took place at times of presidential crises is an indicator of the importance of the 
position.111 Furthermore, more than half of the former presidents of the Republic 
were of military origin. It is argued that since President of Republic is a politically 
neutral figure, s/he can establish agreement between the Armed Forces and the 
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government. Alternatively, it can be stated that the importance attached to the 
President of the Republic by the military owes to the fact that the President has 
many legal powers and duties concerning the Turkish Armed Forces.  
According to article 104, the powers and duties of the President of the 
Republic concerning the Turkish Armed Forces are as follows:  
“to represent the Supreme Military Command of the Turkish 
Armed Forces on behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, to 
decide on the mobilization of the Turkish Armed Forces (in 
emergency situations where the Assembly is on recess), to appoint 
the Chief of the General Staff, to call the National Security Council 
to meet, to preside over the National Security Council and to 
proclaim martial law or state of emergency”.   
Moreover, s/he appoints the members of the Military High Court of 
Appeals and the Supreme Military Administrative Court. Although, the President 
is apparently the highest authority with most functions about the Turkish Armed 
Forces, the main state organ, which is responsible for national security and the 
preparation of the Armed Forces for the defense of the country (to the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly) is the Council of Ministers.112 The same article also 
states that the Chief of General Staff is responsible to the Prime Minister in 
exercising his/her powers and duties.  
The Office of the General Chief of Staff is supposed to act also in close 
collaboration with the Ministry of National Defense. The bulk of the costs of 
Turkish Armed Forces are included under the budget of the Ministry of National 
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Defense. The Ministry of National Defense supplies conscription, health and 
veterinary services, infrastructure, housing, property and financial auditing 
services to the military.113 As such, the Ministry operates as a supportive rather 
than supervisory organization of Turkish Armed Forces.  
Although, as the legislative organ of the state, The Turkish Grand National 
Assembly is vested with the authority to decide on the use of Turkish Armed 
Forces, declare war and send army troops abroad,114 the constitution sets a very 
limited parliamentary oversight over the Turkish Armed Forces, mostly restricted 
to the discussions on defense budget.  
In conclusion, the Turkish Constitution of 1982 establishes many links 
between Turkish Armed Forces and different parts of the constitutional system. 
As a result, the place of the Turkish Armed Forces in the constitutional system is 
intricate, if not ambiguous. Through ambiguous constitutional regulations, it is 
argued that Turkish Armed Forces is given an equal position to any ministry, 
which strengthens it politically. However, it is hard to state that Turkish Armed 
Forces has formally been given an independent role since it is clear that Turkish 
Armed Forces has been put under the control of the executive organs. The overall 
weight of the President on provisions concerning Turkish Armed Forces can be 
attributed to the desire to keep Turkish Armed Forces, the most organized power 
in the country, aloof from political interference in order to prevent its 
politicization.  
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There is no reference as to the functions and duties of the Turkish Armed 
Forces in the constitution. Therefore, it is not possible to state that the constitution 
gives Turkish Armed Forces a “guardianship” or “tutelary” role. However, an 
important legal document which may provide military with a material base for 
political power is the Military Internal Service Code. Article 34 of the Code, 
which defines the duty of the Turkish Armed Forces, states that the main duty of 
the Turkish Armed Forces is to protect the Turkish motherland and maintain the 
Republic with its properties stated in the constitution. This article has been put to 
the forefront by the coup-makers as the legal basis of military interventions of 
1971 and 1980. For that reason, it is argued that the above article should be 
changed in order to make any military intervention less likely. Yet, Article 6 of 
the constitution states that the ultimate authority belies with the nation and no 
organ can use a state power, which is not stated in the constitution. Therefore, 
provisions in complementary laws like Internal Service Code, can be used as a 
pretext for military intervention, yet the constitutional system does not give any 
official political authority to the Armed Forces, despite the common belief in the 
society that it does so.    
4.1.3. The Concept of National Security and National Security Council 
(NSC) 
Like other armies, the main function of the Turkish Armed Forces is to 
work for maintaining national security and to defend the country against foreign 
threats. It often stated that the Turkish constitution of 1982 indirectly empowers 
military through its definition of national security. Since it has a broad definition, 
it allows for including many areas under the issue of national security, which 
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extends the sphere of military issues. Since an ambiguously and broadly defined 
national security concept allows for blurring of the distinctions between national 
security and politics, it increases the possibility of military’s interference in 
politics with referring to national security. As such, who defines national security 
and how it is defined is “crucially relevant for the power distribution between 
civil and military equation.”115  
In this part, the national security concept will be discussed with respect to 
its legal and institutional dimension since it is argued that “it is translation of 
national security into laws, decrees and regulations that in fact gives the Turkish 
military wide latitude in policy making and law enforcement”.116 Therefore, 
public discussions concerning the national security are out of the scope of this 
chapter. 
As stated before, the constitution assigns the Council of Ministers for the 
maintenance of national security. Therefore, the executive branch, not Turkish 
Armed Forces, is assigned to deal with the issues concerning security. Under 
conditions of war, martial law and general mobilization, Turkish Armed Forces 
has been given functions for maintaining the internal security under the control of 
the Chief of Staff.  
Although the executive branch is the main organ vested with the authority 
to define national security, the constitution foresees the establishment of National 
Security Council (NSC), an advisory organ to the government for security 
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matters. It is composed of the Prime Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, 
Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers of Justice, National Defense, Internal Affairs, 
and Foreign Affairs, the Commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Forces and the 
General Commander of the Gendarmerie, and is chaired by the President of the 
Republic.  
The NSC has been established after the military intervention of 1960, and 
was included in the subsequent constitutions. The role of the NSC was 
strengthened as the time passed.117 The phrase that NSC “communicates requisite 
fundamental recommendations to the Council of Ministers”118 has been changed 
with the 1971 intervention to “recommends”. The 1982 constitution stipulated 
that recommendations of the NSC “would be given priority consideration by the 
Council of Ministers”. In addition, the number and weight of senior commanders 
in NSC increased at the expense of its civilian members.119 Thus, the NSC has 
become a major element of Turkey’s national security system, which sets the 
national security policy of the state of the Turkish Republic.120 
The weight of NSC on Turkish politics has been a major concern in 
Turkey’s accession process to EU. The national security is legally defined as “the 
protection and maintenance of the constitutional order, national presence, 
integrity, all political, social, cultural and economic interests in international field 
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as well as against any kind of internal and external threats, of the State”.121 It is 
argued that due to this broad definition, the NSC operates as a second executive 
body which directs a wide range of government polices including agricultural 
development projects, education,122 economic plans,123 development of energy 
sector,124 TV and radio broadcasts,125 foreign trade126 and development of 
National Parks.127 
Following the criticisms stated in the annual Progress Reports of the EU 
Commission, the government has passed a constitutional reform package in 2001 
which aimed at reducing the impact of military on politics though institutional 
changes. The composition of NSC has been changed; Deputy Prime Ministers and 
the Minister of Justice have become permanent members, thereby increasing the 
number of the civilians. By 2003, further reforms were made, which changes the 
Law of the NSC and the Secretariat General of the NSC. With these reforms, the 
Secretary General of the NSC has become a civilian person. Moreover, the posts 
of military members at YOK (High Education Council) and RTUK (Radio 
Television High Council) were abolished.  
The most effective channel that NSC can influence the policy decisions of 
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the government is the National Security Policy Document (NSPD). The NSPD is 
prepared by the General Secretariat of NSC upon proposals by the ministries and 
other related government organizations. Following its approval by the NSC, the 
document is presented to the Council of Ministers for evaluation. It is the route 
map, which includes the general principles to be followed in maintaining the 
general welfare of the state and its people.128 
The most voiced criticism about the NSPD is that the preparation of the 
document is almost exclusively made by the military bureaucracy129 with minimal 
or no inclusion from the government. The divergence of views between the 
government and the military on the document has been put the forefront by the 
national media concerning the preparation of the last NSPD in 2005.130 Due to the 
difference of opinion between the government and the Turkish Armed Forces, the 
approval of the new NSPD is delayed. In January 2005, the Prime Minister sent a 
letter to the Secretary General of the NSC which reminded that the main organ 
responsible from national security is the Council of Ministers. The letter also 
stated that the new NSPD should include recommendations on general principles 
concerning the security policy and should not be prepared as an action plan.131 
Furthermore, the Parliament Speaker, Arınç criticized the fact that NSPD is 
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prepared without contribution by the parliament.132 When their views on these 
comments asked, Chief of General Staff Özkök and AKP Group Vice President 
Kapusuz stated that NSPD is prepared by the Council of Ministers. Speaker of the 
Cabinet Çiçek also stated that the NSPD is discussed within the government as 
such the government is fully informed about its content. As such, there is ongoing 
debate among the political and military elite on preparation process of NSPD. 
While NSC is publicly perceived as a remnant of 1960 military 
intervention and as the most effective institutional channel though which the 
Turkish Armed Forces exercises political power, the recent legal institutional 
amendments has changed the picture. The military, even if with some reluctance, 
has submitted to the adjustments and acted in accordance with the reforms despite 
the fact that “doing so has forced it to let go of power it had felt necessary to build 
up and carefully guard for decades”.133 On the other hand, the legal amendments 
will connote less meaning if they could not find resonance among the wider 
public. The examples like the request of the president of Ankara Chamber of 
Industry from the Secretary General of the NSC to include economic matters in 
the discussions of the NSC134 imply that its overall weight in Turkish politics will 
continue.  
4.2. ECONOMIC SOURCES 
The economic sources of Turkish Armed Forces’ political power are 
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twofold. The share it receives from the national budget supplies the bulk of 
Army’s economic power. Extra-budgeted governmental payments are the second 
source. Thirdly, there are non-governmental economic instruments (channels) 
through which Turkish Armed Forces as an institution may exert political 
influence.  
4.2.1. The Share from the National Budget 
It is often stated that developing countries’ large military spending have 
a negative impact on their level of economic and social development; it reduces 
the share of other government services like education and health sectors. 
Moreover, arms and technology export add to the trade deficit and other budget 
deficits. For these reasons, the amount of the defense budget is a primary concern 
for the civilian governments. As Wendy Hunter states, the civilian governments 
may try to make cuts in the defense budget in order to win the electorate. Taking 
into account military’s general inclination to expand its economic sources in 
terms of arms, logistics, technology and personnel it would not be mistaken to 
state that the defense budget may be an important factor in the distribution of 
power between the civilians and the military.  
Turkey has quantitatively the largest army in Europe and second largest 
after USA in NATO. There are approximately 514.000 soldiers.135 Accordingly, 
its overall defense spending was 8.9 billion US dollars by the year 2001, which 
pertains to approximately 5 % of its Gross Domestic Product. Especially after 
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1988, there is a considerable increase in Turkey’s defense spending. By the year 
2000, defense budget amounts to 7 billion dollars 40 % of which is personnel 
costs, 41 % oil, food, clothes and the like, and 18 % military equipment. 
By the year 2001, the distribution of the defense budget to related 
organizations was as follows. National Defense Ministry get 85 %, Gendarmerie 
gets 15 % while Coastal Security 0.6 %. National Defense Ministry: Land Forces 
get 49.3 %, Air Forces get 21.9 % Navy gets 14.4 %, and Office of the General 
Chief of Staff gets 7.1 %.   
The primary place the Defense Budget occupies in the National Budget 
is determined by the personnel payments and “Extra-personnel Current 
Expenditures” (EPCE). The fact that EPCE amounts to a major element of 
defense budget requires attention. EPCE covers arms and other military 
equipment payments and the army’s needs like food, clothes, oil and the like. 
While one third of the EPCE goes to military equipment, two thirds are other 
needs of the army. It should be noted that most of these spending go for the 
maintenance of Turkey’s largely conscript army, who are not professional 
soldiers. Therefore, although the numbers are high enough to assert that military 
has the control of many economic resources; it is due to the maintenance of a 
large conscript army. 
There are not many studies that focus on Turkey’s military spending. 
Firstly data is heard to reach due to security reasons. Secondly, politicians and 
academicians avoid discussing the issue, in order to avoid being called as non-
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patriotic. Accordingly, the share the Turkish Armed Forces gets from the national 
budget (defense budget) is the least debated and criticized part of the national 
budget. Moreover, the few research that was made recently point to the economic 
effects of the defense spending with no or minimal references to its effect on 
politics.  
Although there is lack of discussion about the defense budget in the 
parliament which is supported by a lack of interest in the academia, a recent 
overall analysis of the defense spending and its share in the budget indicates that 
defense costs of Turkey does not preclude other government services.136 In times 
of economic crises, the decrease in the defense budget was less than decrease in 
other major areas of government spending like education and general services, 
implying the “unavoidable” nature of defense spending. Ekinci argues that this 
correlation of up and downs of  defense budget with other elements is due to the  
politicians’ concern for electoral approval which led them to follow the track that 
defense spending goes in other areas of government spending. Alternatively, it 
can be argued that the defense spending is subject to the economic situation of the 
country and is not independently decided. Therefore, in terms of the share of 
Turkish Armed Forces from the budget, it would be an exaggeration to state that 
its material sources are set independently from the civilian political rule, despite 
civilian elite’s disinclination to discuss military budget due to their considerations 
on other grounds. 
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While Turkish Armed Forces’ share of the national budget can be at best 
perceived as an indicator of projection of its political power into material 
interests, it would be mistaken to assume that its share constitutes a material 
source for its political power. On the other hand, through other economic 
channels, Turkish Armed Forces has a potential to affect the economic standing of 
the Turkey, which supposedly can enhance the Turkish Armed Forces’ political 
power. Government institutions like Undersecretariat of Defence Industries, civil 
society organizations like Turkish Armed Forces Foundation, private institutions 
like OYAK are the main instruments of such economic influence other than 
national budget. They help to advance material sources of Turkish Armed Forces; 
operationalization of such material sources in the political process may provide 
the military with a political leverage against the government through its potential 
to affect Turkey’s economy.   
4.2.2. Undersecretariat of Defence Industries (USDI) and Defence 
Industry Support Fund (DISF) 
The defence costs of Turkey are not only supplied by the share from the 
budget. In early 1980s, the Modernization Program was initiated, which aims to 
strengthen the national military industry. The expenses of this program are to be 
supplied by for Defense Industry Support Fund under the control of for Defence 
Industry Development and Support Administration, established in 1985 by law 
3238. The Administration was renamed as Undersecretariat of Defense Industry 
(SSM) after 1991. The SSM is established under the Ministry of Defense and is 
the primary organ, which is responsible from strengthening cooperation with and 
technology transfer from international companies by signing agreements, the 
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establishment and supporting of Turkish private military industry according to the 
needs of the Turkish Armed Forces. There are three organs under the 
Undersecretariat. First one is High Coordination Council, composed of ministers, 
Chief of General Staff. The decision-making process for arms procurement in 
Turkey is done through the main Executive Committee. The Executive 
Committee is composed of the Prime Minister, the Minister of the National 
Defense and the General Chief of Staff. The needed assets are determined by the 
Turkish General Staff, according to the Strategic Target Plan prepared by the 
General Staff.  
The main elements of the fund are the transfers from the budget and 
other government funds, lottery, shares from the special taxes (like alcohol, 
tobacco, and light arms). It is exempted from various taxes. Moreover, it is 
exempted from regular fiscal government control through Court of Accounts. A 
council of three people from Ministry of Finances, Ministry of National Defense 
and the Premiership is responsible from monitoring and auditing of the Fund.  
The Fund has amounted to 11 billion US dollars since its inception, 
almost 660 million dollars a year. Although significant amount of sources are 
devoted to the Fund, as apparent in the composition of its executive body, 
government takes active part in controlling the fund.  
4.2.3. Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (TAFF) 
Turkish Armed Forces Foundation is established in 1987, through 
amalgamation of previously formed foundations, which are established for 
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empowering the Land, Naval, and Air Forces. Its mission is stated as “to 
contribute to the empowerment of the Turkish Armed Forces and development of 
national defense industry with the material and moral support of the Turkish 
society.” 137  It has subsidiaries, affiliates and indirect subsidiaries.  
4.2.4. Armed Forces Pension Fund (OYAK) 
OYAK was established in 3 January 1961 with a special law adopted by 
the Committee of National Unity shortly after the military intervention of May 
1960.  
The legal status of OYAK has a dual nature: it is established as a under 
the Ministry of National Defense in order to provide some social security benefits 
to the members of Turkish Armed Forces. The Article 37 of the Law states that all 
assets of OYAK have the rights and priorities of other state assets. These two 
properties give OYAK the status of a state enterprise.  Nevertheless, according to 
the same law, OYAK has a private financial and administrative status. Due to its 
dual nature, OYAK benefits both from the immunities and privileges given to any 
state enterprise and a freer hand to operate like private enterprises.  
The administrative structure of OYAK consists of three main bodies. 
The Council of Representatives, headed by either Minister of National Defense or 
General Chief of Staff, is composed of 50 to 100 members, who are appointed by 
their respective seniors. The General Council is composed of 40 people, 9 
members of which are civilian. The civilian members include Minister of National 
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Defense, Minister of Finance, Head of Court of Accounts, Head of Supreme 
Auditing Commission, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Banks 
Association of Turkey, the Chairman of Union of Trade Chambers, Industry 
Chambers and Trade Stocks and three other people from the private sector who 
are competent in economy and finances. The military members are General Chief 
of Staff, Commanders of Air, Naval, Land Forces and Gendarmerie, 6 military 
personnel from either Ministry of National Defense or Turkish General Staff and 
20 members elected by the Council of Representatives.  
The main executive organ of OYAK is the Executive Council, composed 
of 3 military and supposedly 4 civilian members. The military members are 
proposed by the Ministry of National Defense and Turkish General Staff, and 
elected by the General Council, while other 4 members are appointed by a special 
committee, composed of 6 of the above-mentioned civilian members of the 
General Council. Yet traditionally, at least one of these four members has become 
a military person either serving or retired, making majority of the votes military. 
By June 2007, five members of the Executive Committee are soldiers.138    
OYAK Group is among the first three economic giants of Turkey,139 
consisting of 60 firms operating in many sectors including finances, industry and 
services. It is the group with most profits. More than 34.000 people are employed 
in these firms. OYAK has approximately 230.000 members, both civilian and 
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military. As such, it has significant economic power.  
Although OYAK is publicly perceived as the holding of the military, 
since most of its executive members are military origin, it operates as a private 
firm. 140 Recently, due to Group’s decision to sell its bank to a foreign company, it 
received criticisms from the military circles on the grounds that its sale is contrary 
to both national interests, and thus cannot be approved by the members. The 
General Manager of the Group, a civilian, stated that OYAK respects the 
members’ views, yet, since it does not belong to military, its decisions, like any 
other profit-seeking private firm is bound by material considerations 
independently of the political views held by its members. Moreover, it is sued by 
Turkish Retired Non-commissioned Officer’s Association, which argued OYAK’s 
executive cadre is entirely composed of military officers. Despite the widely held 
opinion that OYAK is owned by the military, it is not. While its economic 
strength may contribute to the individual economic interests of its both military 
and civilian members, it is mistaken to assume that it adds up to the material 
sources of the military’s political power as an institution. 
 
4.3. JUDICIAL SOURCES 
Today, in most countries like Turkey, the establishment of military 
courts is recognized in the constitutional systems. In some European countries 
like Germany, Sweden, Denmark and Norway, their existence is restricted to only 
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times of war, whereas in Austria they do not exist even in times of war. In other 
countries like France, Belgium, Spain, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria civilian 
judges take part in the composition of the military courts. With the development 
and expansion of values of human rights and freedoms in the last two centuries, 
the composition of military courts and the borders of their spheres of authority 
have begun to be debated immensely in discussions of fuller democratization.141  
In Turkey, the military and civilian judicial systems are based on 
different procedures. The judicial independence and immunities of military courts 
are subject to divergent levels of regulation. The military judicial system is highly 
independent from the civilian system, which adds to the political autonomy and -
thus political power- of the military as an institution. This duality leads to 
criticisms about the composition of the military judicial bodies and their sphere of 
jurisdiction. Firstly, in Turkey, the military jurisdiction’s sphere of authority 
usually extends to civilian domains due to ambiguities in related regulations. 
More often than not, the civilians or military personnel who commit ordinary 
crimes are tried in military courts. Secondly, the inclusion of non-judge military 
personnel in military courts leads to questions about the independence and 
objectivity of the overall military judicial system. Since these courts also try 
civilians, the problem aggravates.142 
4.3.1. The Military Judicial System 
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In Ottoman times, since every state official belonged to the class of 
“askeriye”, their trials were made in special courts, composed of members of 
Divan-ı Humayun with Sultan as the head. The Janissaries were tried only in their 
own regimens by their own commanding officers. With the establishment of the 
Republic, permanent military courts were established. These courts had one 
military judge and two officers with another military judge as the public 
prosecutor. Article 138 of the Turkish constitution of 1961 stated that majority of 
the members of each military court should be judges. Accordingly, military courts 
were established for each of the army corps (kolordu), armies (ordu), command 
forces (kuvvet komutanlıkları), which are composed of two military judges and a 
military officer.143 However, Turkish constitution of 1982 does not have any 
authoritative regulations concerning the composition of the military courts.144 
While noncommissioned officers or privates are to be tried, one member of the 
court is a noncommissioned officer.  
The military courts of Discipline are composed of three officers, with no 
military judges. The generals and admirals are tried by the Court of the General 
Chief of Staff. The court is composed of five members; three military judges and 
two generals/admirals.  The Military Court of Cassation operates as the high court 
of appeals and is composed of five chambers. Their members are appointed by the 
President of the Republic from amongst the high-ranking military judges 
nominated by the General Council of Military Court of Cassation.   
                                                
143Ministry of National Defense, www.msb.gov.tr/birimler/AsAdlsB/AsAdlsB353Kanun.htm (last 
accessed on 12 June 2007). 
144The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 
 77 
4.3.2. The Extent and the Limits of the Sphere of Military Jurisdiction  
Article 9 of the Code on Composition, Judgment and Procedure of the 
Military Courts states that the military courts are responsible from cases where 
military people commit ‘military crimes’ or any crime against military people, or 
crimes at ‘military places’ or crimes related to their military services and 
obligations. Nevertheless, a single and open definition for ‘military crime’ does 
not exist in related laws. Moreover, although ‘military places’ are enumerated in 
Military Internal Service Law as the military detachments, military quarters, and 
military institutions like military hospitals, factories, schools, and stocks, etc. it 
does not have a definition either. These ambiguities lead to extension of spheres 
of military jurisdiction. For example, when a military person commits a crime in a 
military place, the case is tried by a military court regardless of the nature of the 
crime. 
There are also cases where civilians are tried in military courts. When 
civilian people commit crimes with military accomplices, the military court is 
held responsible for trying even the civilian suspects. Recently, the Şemdinli case, 
where two military officers and an ex-terrorist were brought to the court for 
bombing a bookstore was to be tried in a military court. After judicial and public 
disputes as to where they should all be tried, the problem was resolved by the 
statement of the court of appeals which decided to try them in civilian courts.   
 The Military Criminal Code also allows trial of civilians for certain acts. 
The articles of the Law refer to Articles of Turkish Penal Law, making the stated 
acts as military crimes.  
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Some amendments were made as to the above Codes as a response to the 
criticisms that military and civilian judicial systems are operating as if there are 
two separate inconsistent judicial systems. According to the law amending the 
relevant provisions of the Military Criminal Code, adopted in June 2006, no 
civilian will be tried in military courts in peacetime unless military personnel and 
civilians commit an offence together. The new law also allows for retrial in 
military courts if there is an ECHR decision in favor of the defendant. 
In this chapter, I have looked at the legal, institutional, economic and 
judicial factors that may be regarded as the material sources of the Turkish Armed 
Forces political power. As has been illustrated, these sources are not directly 
convertible into political power. The Turkish constitution does not officially grant 
any distinctive prerogatives to the Turkish Armed Forces. Especially with the 
recent amendments which reduced the overall influence of NSC on setting the 
security agenda of the state, as well as the government’s attempts to claim more 
responsibility concerning issues security, and military budget it is rather 
unconvincing to argue that the Turkish Armed Forces prevalence in Turkish 
politics is the consequence of these material sources. On the other hand, it is 
evident that how securely grounded it might be in the constitution and in the 
related laws, the distinctive place of Turkish Armed Forces in Turkish  politics 
cannot be maintained if it is not cherished in the public mind. In order to dwell 
into the Turkish society’s mind, next chapter will look at the past experiences of 
the Turkish society with its military, which lay the basis for historical sources of 
the Turkish Armed Forces political power. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
HISTORICAL SOURCES OF THE TURKISH ARMED 
FORCES’ POLITICAL POWER 
 
 
 
As seen in the previous chapters, political power, which grows out of 
interaction between the empowered and the empowering, should have a legitimate 
base. The legitimacy operates as the indispensable source of the societal support. 
Such legitimacy springs from the past experiences of the empowered and the 
empowering with respect to each other. In other words, the history of the relations 
between the empowered and the empowering informs the legitimacy out of which 
the political power of the empowered originates. Janowitz also points to the 
importance of the history of the interaction between the society and military, 
when speaking about the wide societal support of the armies which grew out of 
national liberation movements.  
The past practices and experiences of the Turkish Armed Forces and the 
Turkish society with respect to each other, established a unique fabric out of 
which the current pattern of civil-military relations emerges. These historical 
precedents, has set the boundaries of what is ‘normal’, probable and legitimate in
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 the minds of soldiers, politicians and the citizenry. It is true that each historical 
instance of military’s exercise of political power has its own unique causes and 
consequences. For example, it is argued that one of the reasons for 1960 military 
intervention was degradation in the economic status of professional soldiers, 
which is undoubtedly a material/institutional motive. Nevertheless, apart from 
their unique causes and consequences, all of these precedents serve a more all the 
most important function which has strong implications for the future events; the 
function of setting the limits for what is ‘normal’, probable and even expected, 
thus legitimate in a given context.  
  For the sake of parsimony, the arguments related to the historical sources 
of the Turkish Armed Forces’ political power will be grouped under three 
headings: In the first part, the legacy of the Ottoman period will be analyzed. In 
the second part, the role of the Turkish Armed Forces, in the founding of the 
Turkish republic, with emphasis on Ataturkist legacy, will be discussed. Thirdly, I 
will deal with the military interventions of the Turkish modern political history. 
However the account on 1980 coup will be kept in parsimonious limits, since its 
consequences has direct effect on contemporary Turkish civil-military relations, 
which is the subject of the following two chapters.  
5.1. THE OTTOMAN LEGACY 
The special place of the military in Turkish society dates back to the very 
early years of the Ottoman Empire; exemplified in the titles given to first rulers of 
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the nascent Ottoman State: gazi.145 Ottoman Sultans were both military and 
political leaders. For most of the period of the empire’s grandeur, professional 
soldiers were among the top-raking government officials.146  
As such, “military had long enjoyed high prestige in Ottoman society. 
Both individual soldiers and armed forces as an organized group played important 
roles throughout Ottoman times.”147 Although Harris argues that for the account 
of civil-military relations in modern Turkey, “little is to be gained by looking at 
Turkish experience before the latter nineteenth century.”148 a quick look to earlier 
periods may reveal a number of patterns which underlie society’s perception of 
and relationship with the military.  
The executive cadre of Ottoman Empire was named as askeriye (which 
literally refers to the military), which denotes no differentiation between civil and 
military bureaucrats. Such state of mentality was most explicitly at hand in 
Ottoman administrative and economic system, which was based on a fusion of 
military and civilian officers.149  Timar system, which required that an army 
officer, who also acts as a tax collector, raises and holds a number of military men 
under service in return for the share of the taxes he collects from the farmers, was 
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both the backbone of Ottoman economic system on the one hand and supportive 
of military imperialism on the under.150 Apart from his military and economic 
duties, the timar holder also had constabulary duties like maintaining law and 
order. In other words, in the rural parts of the empire, the most of state’s central 
functions –security, administration, and revenue-collection- were performed by 
the same people. This fusion underlie the conviction by some scholars that in the 
Ottoman Empire, the army and the state was deemed as one and the same both in 
capital and the country.151 
During the heyday of the Empire, the armed forces, which were under the 
strict control of their commanders and the sultan, were the main source of power. 
But when the empire began to fall because of unsuccessful military campaigns 
and inability to catch on modernity, the Ottoman military, especially Janissaries, 
became a source of instability and began to frighten their own sovereigns and 
civil population.152 Since Janissaries possessed a virtual monopoly of force at the 
centre of government, they were even able to establish a sort of unstable military 
dictatorship during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Some details 
needed here. 
First serious attempts to redress political infringement of the military came 
from Selim III, however unsuccessful. After him, Mahmut II was able to disband 
the Janissaries, which was praised as Vaka-i Hayriye (the Auspicious Incident) 
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and establish a new in army in 1826.153 In an attempt to modernize this new army, 
he opened several military schools, through which children with middle-lower 
middle class backgrounds can receive a thorough education and open themselves 
up to the winds of enlightenment and advancement.  These schools would later 
serve as a separate milieu for political discussion and cooperation for the 
attainment of political ideals.  
Since this new army was comprised of soldiers who came from within the 
less wealthy and most populous stratum of the Turkish society, they were familiar 
to the lives, habits and troubles of the less advantageous among citizenry, which 
make it possible for them to identify with their problems. On the other hand, since 
they received modern education which was inspired by Western ideas and 
practices, they were eager to bring the benefits of modernization and 
enlightenment to the society. Their desire to bring about changes in the lives of 
ordinary citizens inevitably led to their politicization and give way to a new era in 
the political development of Turkish political system. 
5.1.1. Establishment of First Constitutional Monarchy and Young 
Ottomans 
“The army played a crucial role in the introduction of the First 
Constitution and in 1876 and its reimplementation in 1908”.154 The most 
influential group which led to the establishment of the constitutional monarchy 
was that of Young Ottomans, whose core was established in 1865.155 They were 
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liberal intellectuals, comprised of civilian and military bureaucrats, who thought 
that the sultan’s power should be limited in order to avoid a total collapse of the 
empire.  
The sultan who was unfavorable of such a move, was overthrown with the 
cooperation of the Ottoman fleet surrounding the palace from the waterfront and 
the students from War College. The military involvement in the constitutional 
movement was so vital that Hale even describes the constitutional revolution of 
1876 as a coup d’état.156 The cooperation of military with the educated stratum of 
the Turkish society against the absolutism of the sultan indicates that military was 
also in close relationship with the higher classes of the Turkish society.  They 
shared the same political ideal, which was political liberalization on the one hand, 
and to stop the degradation and dissolution of the empire on the other. 
Despite the progressive ideals of Young Ottomans, the Majlis, which 
opened in 1877, lasted for only one year. The major role played by the navy and 
the War College in the revolution, had a lasting remark on the new sultan 
Abdulhamid. Abdulhamid, trying to preempt a similar overthrow, promoted alayli 
officers at the expense of the graduates of War, while ordered the fleet to be 
anchored to perish in the Haliç. The army maneuvers were not allowed while the 
new military equipment bought from Europe was left unpacked in stocks. Hale 
also points to other material losses of the military in these years: “their uniforms 
were usually in tatters and their pay (which was miserably low in any case) was 
months in arrears. Officers, when they are paid, received government IOUs, 
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which could be cashed by army contractors or money changers, but only at a big 
discount”.157 Though these pre-emptive measures, Abdulhamid thought that  
army’s political power could be contained, which proved wrong.  
Despite the diminishing material conditions of the military under 
Abdulhamid, the military education had gained a new momentum.  Colonel von 
der Goltz from Prussia was appointed as a military advisor, under whom the 
military education system was expanded to a large extent. While economic 
hardship had an important impact on the politicization of army, the expansion of 
military education increased the number of already politicized military students.   
Some argue that the purely professional concerns of the military like 
promotions, pays, technical backwardness “had as much accounted for the army’s 
open revolt in 1908, as the abstract considerations about the virtues of 
democracy” which was mainly ignited by their education system.158 Whether their 
motivation was driven by the desire to redress their material standing or by the 
desire to obtain the ideal of a united and liberal government is still a matter of 
dispute. Nonetheless, it was under these dire straits that they were able to set the 
stage for another revolution in 1908. 
5.1.2. Establishment of Second Constitutional Monarchy and 31 March 
Incident  
“The revolution of 1908 and the prominent part played by officers in the 
period of the Young Turk rule formed a backdrop for the republican era. The 
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Young Turk experiences established precedents for military activism in politics 
that influenced the environment of the Republic to follow.”159  
While the 1876 revolution was almost a coup, the military’s role in 1908 
was even more immense. The centre of the opposition to Abdulhamid’s regime 
was a group of students and young graduates of the military schools. As early as 
1889, the initial core of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP),160 was 
established by students at the military medical college. After a failed coup attempt 
in 1896, Young Turks began to organize in exile. At the same time, the serving 
army officers were establishing their own secret organizations in different parts of 
the empire. One of them was Fatherland and Freedom Society founded by 
Mustafa Kemal and his fellow officers in Damascus. Another one, Ottoman 
Freedom Society, was founded in Selanik by Mehmet Talat -who was a civilian, 
working as a post office clerk- and later joined by Ahmed Cemal, and Captain 
Enver, the so-called Young Turk triumvirate of 1913-1918.   
The revolution began in Macedonia when Ahmed Niyazi, adjutant-major 
in Resne, with his 200 soldiers took hold of Resne garrison’s arms, ammunition 
and treasury and took off to the hills. Their objective was to restore the 
constitution of 1876. The revolt could not be suppressed by Istanbul, and 
Abdulhamid conceded.    
Although it was the young officers who directed the revolution, the army 
was by no means united in their attitude to the revolution. The bulk of the army, 
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ordinary soldiers and alayli officers, were loyal to the sultanate, while a 
substantial part of it was neutral. Moreover, those who supported the revolution –
educated young officers and upper echelons- were divided in themselves, 
paralleling their two aims which were not necessarily complementary: to defend 
territorial integrity on the one hand and achieve political liberalization on the 
other. Those who value territorial integrity more, the unionists, were in favor of a 
strong central government while liberals were supporting a quasi-federal structure 
with greater freedom for all social groups. They were also more inclined to 
cooperate with civilian bureaucrats.   
As with the army, the Ottoman society was divided in their attitude 
towards the revolution. A considerable part of the society in Istanbul was “stern if 
befuddled Islamic traditionalists who opposed the constitution and the 
Westernized professional and intellectuals.”161 Their main concern was to 
eradicate any possibility of a diversion from Islamic rule, as well as granting of 
more autonomy to non-Muslim minorities.  
Like progressive elements in the society, traditionalists also sought army’s 
support. The 31 March Incident, the mutiny of ordinary soldiers, backed up by 
alayli officers and religious students, was initially successful in replacing the 
government. The rebels also demanded that Islamic law is completely 
implemented, a demand to which Abdulhamid, almost voluntarily, compromised.  
The response to the revolt came also from the army. Third Army in 
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Selanik, mobilized to defend the constitutional system with the support of 
volunteers from religious minorities of the empire. The first reason was of course 
to defend the constitution. The other one was more important in professional 
terms: it was revolt by other ranks against the high command, which indicates that 
the long-cherished value of hierarchy in the Ottoman army was in jeopardy.  
The revolution was repressed and the outcome was imposition of martial 
law in Istanbul. The royal prerogatives of the sultan were reduced, which 
provided a freer hand to the parliament, was then dominated by members of the 
CUP. 
The 31 March Incident is significant in terms of understanding the limits 
of convergence between the society and the military, as it is illustrative of the 
possible areas of collision between them. The clash of two trends, traditionalism 
and progressivism, is still a fundamental concern in modern Turkey, which is 
exemplified by the Turkish Armed Forces keen interest in protecting the secular 
nature of the regime on the one hand, and Turkish society’s strong religious 
feelings and attachment to religious customs like headscarf and religious public 
figures on the other. The projection of this schism into contemporary Turkish 
political life will be analyzed in detail in the Chapter 5.    
5.1.3. Committee of Union and Progress and the First World War 
Indeed some scholars deem the period after 31 March incident (1909-
1913) as an outright military dictatorship. On the other hand, due to CUP’s inner 
struggles and the divergence of views in the military ranks, the Cabinets formed 
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one after the other were not as authoritative as such. Military officers who were 
liberalists formed many groups oppositional to CUP. The most important was 
Halaskar-i Zabitan which managed to force resignation of the Cabinet and 
formation of a new one, which was more independent of the CUP.   
While the army officers were totally intermingled by politics, there were 
also attempts to drive politics out of the army, like prohibition of political 
activities by the army officers. Nevertheless, by 1913, thanks to their success in 
re-conquering Edirne in the Second Balkan War, the leading three members of the 
CUP, Enver Talat and Cemal, has gained Cabinet posts, which would drive the 
Empire into WWI.   
At the time when Ottoman Empire had entered the First World War, the 
state apparatus was apparently controlled by a military dictatorship in the hands of 
Enver, Talat and Cemal. Nonetheless, under the surface, it is debatable whether it 
was one-man rule of Enver, a single party dictatorship or a straightforward 
military regime.162 But since leading figures of CUP were military officers like 
Enver, it is true that the military elite had an effective control of the government.  
Their political power emanated from basically two sources. Firstly, the 
wars fought before WWI, has put the army in the forefront of debates. Especially 
the relative success in the Second Balkan War provided with them a source of 
prestige both in the eyes of the elite and the public.163 Secondly, the fact that the 
army was the “bedrock of state…harbingers of enlightenment and vanguard of 
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reform” which was a result of their modernized military education, brushed up 
their corporate identity and political mission.164 Probably, while the prestige they 
had in the eyes of the public provided them with the necessary societal support 
which translated itself into a freer hand in the actual takeover of the government 
as a power exercise, their ability to remain in the government owes more to the 
second source: their political mission to modernize and implement reforms in the 
society. This mission was especially supported by the more educated circles in the 
cities, who believed that such reforms will enhance the standard of living in the 
empire. With the support of them, the government attempted to undertake many 
reforms even under the harsh conditions of war.  
First reform was, in 1914, the abolishment of the capitulations, a set of 
legal and fiscal privileges which foreign merchants resident in the Empire 
benefited at the expense of state revenues.165  In 1915, a law which encouraged 
domestic industry was enacted and in 1917, the first Turkish owned private bank, 
Ottoman National Bank was established. Through these reforms, the government 
tried to strengthen empire’s economy as well as economic condition of Ottoman 
citizenry. 
The government’s attempts to make reforms on the cultural sphere were 
also drastic. With an inclination to curb the power of the ulema, the religious 
courts were brought under the Ministry of Justice in 1915. While all religious 
schools were transferred to the Ministry of Education in the same year, in 1917, a 
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new family law was enacted which made a marriage a secular contract. What is 
more, Enver was planning to reform the Arabic script.166  
Most of these attempts became unsuccessful because of the fall of the 
empire in 1918. Nevertheless, they are important in two ways. Firstly, they are 
indicative of the military’s conviction that it is the army who will lead the society 
in the modernization path. Secondly, these attempts mark the political direction 
that would be taken by the successors of Young Turks in the aftermath of the 
War. 
5.2. FOUNDATION OF THE REPUBLIC, TURKISH ARMED FORCES 
AND THE ATATURKIST LEGACY 
The historical factor that has the most impact on the relationship between 
Turkish society and the modern Turkish military is the memory of the major role 
military played in the establishment of the republic. Although for the military, this 
role cannot be separated from the legacy of Atatürk, the Turkish society honors 
Turkish military independently of the Kemalist ideology. This is in part due to the 
nature of that period.  War of Independence was a struggle both against foreign 
domination on the one hand, and for the establishment of a democratic republic on 
the other. The Turkish military receive credits from the society for its contribution 
to both struggles. Therefore, it is not unusual that those who does not have great 
sympathy for Atatürk and his understanding of democratic republic, still respects 
Turkish military. 
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5.2.1. War of Independence 
“The importance of military in Turkish politics greatly accentuated in 
following the Empire’s defeat in 1918”167 After the defeat of the empire and the 
signing of the Mudros Armistice, the allied powers required the demobilization of 
the Army. Yet, some commanders like Kazim Karabekir and Ali Fuat Cebesoy, 
did not concede to disband their forces. The army preserved its discipline and its 
clear chain of command.168  The military as well as the society considered that the 
great defeat was the fault of the Sultan and the government. The army by resisting 
the order of the Sultan to disband, showed resistance against the failed politicians 
and their policies.   
According to Rustow, like Turkish military, the Turkish society was also 
determined to resist after the first intrusions by allied powers. Several groups and 
guerilla movements, known as Kuvay-i Milliye, emerged to resist the invasion, yet 
these groups lacked organization. Therefore the army’s and the former military 
officers’ involvement as the organizing element of resistance was a direct 
outcome of an appeal by the Anatolian masses. Other political forces which might 
have answered to this appeal were debarred from offering any effectual initiative. 
Consequently, the army and its officer corps were “propelled into action” by the 
society.    
The CUP was downgraded by first their decision to enter into, then their 
defeat in the war. It was widely criticized and disdained by the society. On the 
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other hand, the political aura that they created after the Revolution of 1908 had 
major impact on political life of ordinary citizens. “The Young Turk decade had 
created a broadening of the circle of civilian political participation”. There were a 
number of newspapers published in Istanbul as well as throughout Anatolia. 
Moreover, CUP had centers in major cities.  
When Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues decided to organize the already 
existing movement of resistance, the remnants of this Young Turk rule was 
helpful. Because of the bad reputation CUP leaders had in the eyes of the public, 
they refrained from identifying with the CUP. Nevertheless, there was a 
”continuation of personnel between the Young Turk and Kemalist periods.”169 
Later in 1923, Mustafa Kemal accepted being a CUP member: 
We were all members of the Society for Union and 
Progress. That transformed itself into the Renovation Party. A 
large majority of the members of the aforesaid Society and of the 
subsequently established Party joined and participated in the 
society for Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia which 
arose from the noble resolve of our nation, and they accepted the 
programme of the latter Society.170 
The military officers who took part in the nationalist government were 
mostly former middle and lower rank members of the CUP. Most of them were 
young and they were brought up by an education system “when Young Turk 
agitation for liberal and constitutional principles was rife in military schools.”171 
A comparison of military personnel who took part in Istanbul and Ankara 
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governments between 1914 and 1923 reveals that successful commanders of the 
World War mostly joined to the Anatolian movement since “Atatürk himself was 
careful not to waste talent from the Ottoman regime.”172 These commanders were 
mostly Turkish in origin, having born in Istanbul and Macedonia as opposed to 
diverse origins of those who took part in the Istanbul Cabinets. As such, their 
ethnic background was same with the Anatolian masses, which was an asset in 
gaining their support and trust. One may even argue that the society regarded 
these officers as the true embodiment of the Turkish society.  
At the early phases of the military upsurge the nationalists received much 
support from the Unionist officers in the War Office and the General Staff in 
Istanbul.173 Especially the officers in the CUP’s underground organization, which 
was known as Karakol174  were responsible for arms trafficking from stocks of the 
Empire in Istanbul to Ankara.  
Although “the initial impetus and grass-roots organization of the 
nationalist movement owed much to the former CUP” Ataturk and his comrades 
rejected its exiled leaders and their imperialist dreams.175 They set their goals and 
methods in a manner that was substantially different from the former CUP 
practice. Recognizing that an effective military resistance should be backed up by 
organized civilian support, and that “an army with a hostile or indifferent 
population it its rear” would not be able to fight the external enemies, the Ankara 
movement worked hard to supply itself with a solid civilian base. While CUP, 
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having long cherished the ideas of constitutionalism and support, gradually 
concentrated the political power in the military hands, the nationalist government 
looked for a wide representation and open discussion. This attitude of the 
nationalists is again an indication of the fact that, during the years of war of 
national liberation, there was strong interaction between the Turkish military and 
the Turkish society that was based on trust, mutual empowerment and open 
discussion. .    
In order to provide a solid platform for the interaction of the society with 
the military, the representative civilian institutions of government were 
established even before full scale military operations were undertaken. In the 
Amasya Declaration, it was stated that the decisions taken would be performed by 
the army. Nevertheless, most signatures under the document were also of military 
commanders. Therefore, the organized movement was initiated by the military. 
The congresses held in Sivas and Erzurum were important steps in unifying the 
civilian support for the movement. The movement was so effective that their 
attempts found resonance in the last Ottoman Majlis, which was mostly 
comprised of military officers. The convergence between the Ankara and Last 
Ottoman Majlis was evident in their adoption of Misak-ı Milli, “the National 
Pact”. After its closure and expulsion of nationalists, most members of it joined 
the Grand National Assembly, which opened in 1920 in Ankara.     
Ataturk himself resigned from the Ottoman army in July 1919. Some 
claim that his resignation is a powerful indicator of his conviction that “a time 
might come when political and military functions could not legitimately or 
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effectively be combined in the same person.”176 On the other hand, it was 
practically impossible at that time for Ataturk to retain his post and act as the 
leader of the movement, since from this time on the movement has taken an 
irreversible pace. While nationalist army officers were detaching themselves from 
the empire and running to the heart of the society in Ankara, the society was 
gradually turning into a Turkish army in order to protect its motherland. At this 
time, when the borders between the society and its army were becoming 
increasingly blur, there appeared a clear distinction between the Ottoman 
government and the imperial army on the one hand, and the Turkish national army 
on the other. As such, Ataturk could not maintain its post in the former, while he 
began to emerge as the head of the latter.  
Soon after the opening of the Grand National Assembly, the General Staff 
was organized as separate ministry which was held responsible to the parliament 
like other ministries. The General Staff was to be elected by the parliament. In 
5.9.1920, a law was enacted which ban the interference of military officers under 
the rank of Kolordu Commander. One year later, in the delicate moments of war, 
Mustafa Kemal was appointed as Supreme Commander for a period of three 
months. The Assembly was very sensitive with this post, and did not easily agree 
to prolong it later three more times by three months each time. Therefore, even 
under dire war conditions the nationalists in Ankara were very careful to assure 
that the army was under the control of the Assembly. Although the organized 
movement of resistance was initiated by the military, the society gradually 
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emerged as the actual power holder, which has been able to control its army 
effectively.    
Although every effort was made to assure the civilian control of the 
military, there were Generals, who had important posts both in the government 
and the Assembly, a fact which would change soon after the foundation of the 
Republic. The most serious opposition to Mustafa Kemal came also from the 
Generals. Very much like the way the military successes of Mustafa Kemal had 
brought him fame and support, the same military background were an invaluable 
political asset for his rival generals, like Rauf Orbay, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Refet 
Bele and Kazim Karabekir. Among them, Rauf Orbay was a liberal nationalist, 
who served as a minister of navy in the Ottoman government during WWI. 
However, he did not serve as a commander in the War of Independence. The other 
three had active military posts in both wars. Especially, Kazim Karabekir was an 
able commander and famous for his refusal to disband his army after Mudros 
Armistice. As such, he had strong popular support and was a powerful rival 
against Mustafa Kemal. While Rauf Orbay was more robust in politics, Kazim 
Karabekir enjoyed more popularity both in the Assembly and in the public due to 
his military background. 
The main concern of this oppositional group was to avert the 
establishment of a personal dictatorship of Mustafa Kemal. The dispute between 
them was not a military bid for power, yet it is evident that these generals used 
their military background as an ideational source of their political power, an asset 
which brought them support both in the parliament and in the eyes of the 
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society.177 
5.2.2. First Republic  
The decisive factor that enabled Mustafa Kemal to take an upper hand 
against his rivals was his success in assuring the support of the army as an 
institution. There were two reasons behind his attempt to assure such support., 
First of all, before the announcement of the Republic, the military was in 
miserable economic condition, even so that “the danger of a revolt by unruly 
soldiers” was narrowly averted. In order to prevent that from happening, Mustafa 
Kemal demobilized the army and reorganized it as nine territorially based corps.  
Secondly, as stated before, his most powerful political rivals were among 
the generals, who as successful commanders enjoyed a similar level of popular 
support as he enjoys in the eyes of the society as well as among the corps. He 
appointed K. Karabekir and Ali F. Cebesoy as inspectors as a precaution against 
their opposition and remove them from Ankara shortly before the establishment 
of the Republic on 23 October 1923. After Refet Bele’s post was abolished, he 
resigned from the army. Through these maneuvers, Mustafa Kemal guaranteed his 
election as the President.  On the other hand, in order to avert a coup, he was 
cautious enough to assure their support on other occasions. Before the abolition of 
the Caliphate, he took part in army maneuvers and spent two months with Fevzi 
Cakmak and other commanders in order gain their affirmation.  
He went on to exclude the generals from taking part in the parliament. On 
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19 December 1923, a law passed which stated that serving army officers, 
including generals, cannot be elected as deputies. Since Karabekir and Cebesoy 
were already deputies at the time, the law did not affect their standing. Later, the 
same law was included in the Article 23 of the 1924 Constitution. Moreover, with 
the abolition of the Caliphate, Chief of General Staff was made directly 
responsible to the president. Moreover, 1924 Constitution, in Article 40, vested 
status of the Supreme Commander of Armed Forces to Grand National Assembly 
“as represented by the President of the Republic”. Later, with new Military Penal 
Code, any member of armed forces was banned from joining a political party, 
holding or participating in political meetings, giving a political speech in public or 
preparing, signing or sending to the press any declaration of a political nature.178 
After these legislations which were supposed to deprive serving military 
officers from any political power, the opposing generals were forced to resign 
from their posts, while those who were loyal to Mustafa Kemal preferred military 
careers. As such, the army’s loyalty to Mustafa Kemal was guaranteed.179 Only 
after this assurance, he went on to undertake other reforms.180    
5.2.3. Atatürkist Legacy 
It is generally argued that the main difference between the Latin-American 
armies and the Turkish army is that the Turkish army had never intervened for 
personal or institutional gains and has been quick to return to barracks after the 
political situation is rectified. The reason for this is given as the Ataturkist legacy, 
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which encourages the Turkish army to accept the principle of civilian supremacy.  
Nevertheless, the military interventions of the Turkish army in 1960, 1971, 
1980 and its later political practices indicate that, the Turkish army has never been 
aloof from politics. Moreover, it is not unusual that at each instance of political 
interference by the armed forces, the military generals justify their action by 
referring to Ataturk’s sayings and practices. As George Harris blatantly puts:  
…the Atatürkist legacy is an ambiguous one. On the one 
hand, it forbids serving army officers to play any part in the 
legislature; on the other, it encourages them to think of 
themselves as the ultimate guardian of the Atatürk’s 
revolution.181 
Supposedly from the initial phase of the liberation struggle, Ataturk had a 
vision of a modern and unified nation-state which would take its equal place in 
the modern world. Rather than relying on his personal charisma and power, his 
purpose was to establish a firm structure, which would continue to exist long after 
his death.  
Within this picture, the role he foresaw for the army was more than 
guarding the frontiers of the country. It was to be a forerunner of reforms, “ a 
fountainhead of progressive practices” a vital organ for both the spread and 
maintenance of the reforms he made.182 The army, very much like in the Ottoman 
days, was the backbone of the regime and its ultimate base of power. In 1931, at a 
meeting in Konya, Ataturk said: 
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Whenever the Turkish nation has wanted to take a step up it 
has always looked to the army…as the leader of movements to 
achieve lofty national ideals…when speaking of the army, I am 
speaking of the intelligentsia of the Turkish nation who are true 
owners of this country. The Turkish nation considers its army the 
guardian of its ideals.183  
As the forerunner of reforms and the guardian of the regime, the army 
could not simply be out of politics. The military in the Kemalist era remained a 
key actor in the balance of political power. The Chief of General Staff, although 
not a minister, enjoyed a relatively independent status. He was directly attached to 
the Presidency on the one hand, and taking part in the Cabinet meetings, which 
led to projection of military interests in development programs like for example 
road and railroad building. “Most of the Republic’s early development program in 
the 1930s was shaped by military considerations.”184  
Thus, the Ataturkist legacy of the military has three main components:   
1. respect for hierarchy 
2. devotion to the broadly secular modernizing reforms set in train by 
Atatürk 
3. acceptance of the principle of ultimate legitimacy of civilian 
rule.185  
Although each component had strong impact had strong impact on the 
later political deliberations of the military, these components were not always 
complementary. The Ataturkist legacy encouraged the military elite to intervene 
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in politics at times of regime threat on the one hand, and constrain the longevity 
of military rule and pushed for a quick civilianization of the regime on the other.  
5.3. MILITARY INTERVENTIONS OF THE REPUBLICAN ERA 
After the death of Atatürk, İnönü, a former general, became the President. 
During his time a number of important steps have been made to ensure civilian 
control of the military. The Second World War had caught Turkish army 
unprepared, organizationally and technically backward. The army’s and the Chief 
of General Staff’s independent status were seen as the reason for this defect.186 
The Ministry of National Defense was responsible for simply presenting and 
defending the military budget and had no role in making policies and determining 
the priorities.187  In 1944, Inönü tried to change this picture by making the Chief 
of General Staff subordinated and responsible to the Prime Minister, yet allowing 
him to deal directly with ministers on matters of mutual concern.188 
In 1949, a new enactment was made, which placed the Chief of General 
Staff under the Ministry of National Defense, and reorganized the former 
territorially-based armed forces, under three separate forces as air, navy and 
army.189     
5.3.1. 1960 Coup  
In 1946, Turkey entered an era of multiparty system with the 
establishment of the Democrat Party, which raised questions about the future of 
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relations between the army and the civilian elite. As the first and the single party 
of the Republic, the Republican People’s Party shared a similar world-view with 
the military. This similarity was based on the legacy of Ataturk which informed 
basic principles on which the military and the party as well as the state were 
established. Before, since there was no practical distinction between the state and 
the Republican People’s Party, the army’s relations with the government was 
substantially smooth.190 Although some new ideologies began to receive support 
by a few younger military officers, like pan-Turkism and communism, they had 
almost no affect on the civil-military relations of the single party period. With the 
establishment of the Democrat Party however, it became clear that such smooth 
civil-military relations may not endure.  
“The military takeover of the 1960 was deemed as a 
point of departure from the previously established patterns of 
civil-military relations. Although the takeover was justified 
as an action to protect democracy, it was actually designed to 
face a threat to RPP, which represented the role model for 
civil military relations in Turkey since 1923.”191  
The first political groups established in the army were supportive of 
Democrat Party, with an intention to prevent dishonest elections.192 A group 
organized in Staff College in Istanbul begin to talk about of a military 
intervention in as early as 1947. Realizing the need for support form higher ranks, 
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they contacted General Fahri Belen but he argued against any action before the 
upcoming elections. Although the idea of making a coup was dismissed, upheaval 
in military continued.  
At the same time, both DP and RPP tried to attract military personalities to 
bolster their political appeal, since they often enjoyed a considerable prestige 
within the society.193 These political dealings led to increasing politicization of 
the army. On the other hand, both parties were eager to ensure that the military 
was kept in control of the civilians. The 1949 enactments were indicative of this 
attitude. 
Soon after the elections in 1950, which brought DP to the power, the 
retired generals who were supportive of DP came to important posts, like Chief of 
General Staff and Minister of National Defence.194  The overall military 
conviction was that their position was strengthened. Within one year, however, 
partly because of the disillusionment of former generals from politics and partly 
because of DP’s political attitude, no military personality remained in the DP 
government.  
By the same time, Turkey had entered the NATO and Turkish Armed 
Forces began to receive technologically advanced equipment as well as military 
education both in the US and the Western Europe. These circumstances bolstered 
the professional complaints of younger officers, who began to lose respect for 
their traditionally minded superiors. Moreover, military officers were 
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inadequately paid, a problem so acute which led to resignation of one third of 
commissioned officers by 1956.195  
Probably, more disturbing than all to the Turkish Armed Forces were the 
concessions made by DP to the detriment of the Kemalist reform program. DP 
leaders offered special treatment to minority groups; even tribal leaders in the 
Kurdish areas were allowed great autonomy in their tribal affairs.196 Secondly, 
Democrats relaxed restrictions on religious practices which were blamed for 
“giving rise to an upsurge of superstition and even open attacks on Ataturk by 
religious fanatics.”197 This was deemed as a serious threat to secularism, one of 
the most important reforms of Ataturk that military was envisaged to protect. And 
lastly, the DP government’s economic policies, especially lack of planning as well 
as the government’s support for newly emerging middle classes of rural origin, 
monopolizing wealth and status in the society.  
By 1954, new groups in the army were established, this time mostly 
critical of the DP government. They had professional concerns, “the primary aim 
was…to seek reform in the military.”198 They were also greatly dissatisfied with 
many of their senior commanders. But as the political agitation between the 
parties reached its peak, the DP government tried to use military for political 
purposes (which was a fatal mistake according to Karpat),199 the military officers 
became extremely politicized, and a consensus was reached between the 
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conspirators to make a coup. While the younger officers sought a period of 
military rule in order to implement some social reforms, others were in favour of 
returning the government to the civilian rule in a few months. This disagreement 
could not be solved until after the coup took place in 27 May 1960. 
In the aftermath of coup, the younger officers who preferred a longer 
military rule were purged. As such, more radical elements in the military were 
prevented to meddle in politics which provided a freer hand to civilian politicians. 
Karpat claims that after this moment, there remained  
…no military junta installed in power, although there 
were military personnel in some important positions… The 
military rule was wide open from the beginning to cooperation 
and intercourse with civilians and these civilians belonged 
overwhelmingly to the RPP.200  
Nevertheless, the Committee of National Unity, the group of 38 coup-
makers, was eager to ensure more room for military say in Turkish politics. Its 
members were accorded permanent seats in the Senate, provided that they did not 
establish political affinity with any political party. The leader of the coup, Cemal 
Gürsel, was elected as the President of the Republic. The Committee has also 
guaranteed that military officers obtained the right to vote. The Chief of General 
Staff was once more subordinated to the President of the Republic, who at the 
same time represented the Turkish Armed Forces as the Supreme Commander in 
war and peace time. Moreover, the new constitution established the National 
Security Council (NSC), an advisory organ to the cabinet, comprised of Force 
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Commanders and the Chief of General Staff with a few civilian ministers.  
Having realized the perils of centralization and a strong and relatively 
independent government, the constitution of 1961 has pursued a weak 
government, constrained by the checks and balances. On the other hand, it gave 
more freedom to the public; especially freedom of association was enhanced. 
Nevertheless, the formula of a weak government, a stronger military and a freer 
public proved detrimental to the political stability and civilian control of the 
military.  
5.3.2. 1971 Memorandum 
The military intervention of 1971 was not a full scale military takeover. 
It was a memorandum signed by top commanders of the army and sent to 
President Sunay, former Chief of General staff who had been elected as president 
after Gürsel’s health deteriorated. The memorandum stated that the government 
and the parliament had driven the country into anarchy, a new government should 
be set up to implement some reforms and if these measures were not undertaken 
the military would directly intervene.   
With the 1961 constitution, Turkey had entered a period of pluralism. 
The international ideological currents had also affected especially younger 
generations in Turkey. Right wing and left wing extremist groups emerged, who 
favor armed struggle. Bank robbing and kidnappings became common. As a result 
violence spread throughout streets and university campuses. The reluctance of the 
government (which was headed by Justice Party) to impose martial law and take 
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steps was the main reason behind the memorandum. 
With the 1971 military intervention, the government was forced to 
resign and a new government was established under Nihat Erim, a neutral figure. 
The parliament was not closed so the state began to be run by two centers of 
power: military commanders and the parliament. Because of the parliamentary 
opposition, the land and tax reforms demanded by the military could not be made. 
On the other hand, military pressure had managed the parliament to implement 
martial law, which “unleashed forces beyond government’s control.”201 Under the 
martial law, strikes were outlawed, freedom of press was restricted and some 
newspapers were suspended. Moreover, instances of torture were reported. On 20 
Sep 1971 and 8 Feb 1972, two packages of constitutional amendments passed 
which “restricted some personal rights, the freedom of association and the press 
and autonomy of the universities and the state broadcasting organization” 
established State Security Courts and extended the period of detention.202  
To the already existing problems of double-headedness of government, 
Presidential election crisis added when by 1973 the duration of service of Sunay 
ended. Until that time, election of the former Chief of General Staff as the 
president almost became a tradition in the Republic, only exception being Celal 
Bayar. While the military openly sought for Faruk Gürler’s (the chief of General 
Staff at the time) presidency, the parliament did not comply with this preference, 
yet a straightforward military takeover did not take place as threatened. Later, 
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Fahri Korutürk, a civilian candidate with a military background was elected, 
which was seen as a compromise by the military and the parliament alike. 
5.3.3. 1980 Coup  
 The circumstances that led to the 1980 coup were similar to those of 1971 
memorandum, yet much more grave. The country was rife with political, sectarian 
and ethnic violence and political murders. Although martial law was declared, the 
strife could not be stopped. While Demirel has blamed the generals for not fully 
implementing the martial law with the purpose of legitimizing the future military 
intervention, the military commanders stated that their subordination to civilian 
authorities in their decisions203 had left them incapable of dealing with the 
problems.204 What is more, another Presidential election crisis took place after 
Korutürk’s term has ended in March 1980. The parties were not able to agree on a 
candidate. 
What differentiated the 1980 coup from 1960 and 1971 interventions was 
that this time; there was previous intensive planning and organization by the 
military. The goals were set, the methods for a smooth process of civilianization 
were already discussed and the coup took place under a clear chain of command. 
Unlike previous instances, there were no conspiracies for a coup among the 
younger officers. Basic decisions were made within National Security Council, 205  
(NSC) which included Chief of General Staff Evren, Commanders of Navy, Air 
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and Ground Forces and the Secretary General.  
According to Karpat, the military did not have support from any one 
specific civilian group; rather they succeed in attaining widespread support from 
the society, which had been exhausted because of the violence that had broke out. 
The level of violence had been such that the society saw the military nearly as a 
savior from disaster.  
In the aftermath of the coup, Gen. Evren’s attitude was also effective in 
attaining and maintaining societal support. He usually spoke on behalf of the 
nation; he condemned politicians’ excessive partisan considerations and argued 
that such attitude had been to the detriment of the nation’s interest, without 
attacking by name the party leaders. In his public speeches, he was able to show 
his concern for the society, by informing them about the key developments that 
took place.206  
The NSC’s closure of itself to any influence from the politicians has 
increased the popular respect and trust for the army, which added to their supra-
party image. Meanwhile, the public order was restored and the economy, which 
has experienced a crash before the coup, began to revitalize. These were the 
circumstances under which NSC established a Consultative Assembly in June 
1981 to draft a new constitution. This assembly consisted of 160 members, forty 
of whom were appointed directly by the NSC and the remaining 120 selected 
from a list of about 10,000 names brought together with the aid of provincial 
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governors. In July 1982, a fifteen-member constitutional committee of the 
Consultative Assembly produced a draft that subsequently was amended by the 
Consultative Assembly and the NSC. The constitution was submitted to a public 
referendum on November 7 and approved by 91.4 percent of the voters; 91.3 
percent of the registered electorate cast ballots.  
a Consultative Assembly was established through selection of applicants 
by the NSC.  It prepared the new constitution and after the last checks was made 
by the NSC, it was put for public referendum. The constitution of 1982 was 
approved by 90 per cent of the votes and Kenan Evren has been elected as the 
new President.207 
Despite the society’s relief after the coup and subsequent approval of the 
constitution by the public, the results of election that took place in 1983 were a 
surprise to military leaders, and especially Evren, since the majority of the votes 
went to Turgut Ozal’s Motherland Party, the party least favored by and relatively 
free of compliance to the military.  
The 1980 coup and 1982 constitution have important consequences for 
contemporary civil-military relations in Turkey, which will be dealt with in 
subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL SOURCES OF THE TURKISH 
ARMED FORCES’ POLITICAL POWER 
 
 
 
The last group of sources of the Turkish Armed Forces’s political power 
consists mainly of its relationship with society, both culturally and in daily life. It 
includes identity formation and cultural myths on the one hand and the role that is 
ascribed to the military concerning the future expectations of the society on the 
other hand. In this chapter it will be argued that the social bonds between the 
military and the society may help to understand why military is ascribed such 
political power and duties. 
In this chapter, in line with consensual power theories particularly that of 
Arendt, it will be argued that the Turkish Armed Forces is attributed political 
power by the society in order to reflect their anxieties.208 Turkish Armed Forces is 
given power by the society. There are basically three dimensions as to this 
attribution. Firstly, the society defines itself as a military-nation and establishes
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 cultural bonds with the Turkish Armed Forces which evolve around the rituals 
concerning military conscription. The convergence of military and civilian 
identities leads to the establishment of a strong bond of trust between the two. 
Secondly, the military and the society have various points of touch in daily life, 
like civil society organizations and social developmental support activities of the 
military. These reflect and extend the positive identification of the Turkish Armed 
Forces by the wider society. While it helps the Turkish Armed Forces to measure 
the tension of and anxieties within the society, they also act as an instrument of 
influence by the society. Moreover, they help to protect and strengthen the 
positive image of Turkish Armed Forces. And finally, discursive practices by the 
military and its convergence with the public opinion constitute another dimension 
of the multifaceted relationship between the public and the military. Upon 
analyzing military’s public speeches and tracing public opinion on recent political 
matters, it will be argued that Turkish Armed Forces acts almost as a political 
party, whose policies and activities reflect the hopes and anxieties of the society. 
Turkish Armed Forces effectively takes the society’s pulse in political matters 
with a consideration to maintain and augment the support that it receives from the 
society 
In this chapter, these three dimensions of the relationship between the 
Turkish Armed Forces and the wider society will be analyzed through allocating a 
separate part to each of them. They underlie the social and cultural basis upon 
which the Turkish military establishes its self-definition as the “permanent 
institution of the state” as opposed to the elected governments and offer an 
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explanation as to why Turkish Armed Forces is described as  “the institution 
which can best interpret and uphold the general interests of the nation” above 
partisan politics.209  
6.1. CULTURAL SOURCES 
6.1.1. A Military Nation 
In 1992, then chief of general staff Gen. Doğan Güreş proclaimed self-
confidently that Turkey is a military state.210 This assertion is acknowledged not 
only by the military people, but also finds resonance on the wider public. 
Accordingly, it is often stated that “Turkish people are a military-nation.”211 A 
statement by İstemihan Talay, then Minister of Culture in 1999 reflects this 
convergence: 
Turks have been known as a military nation throughout the 
history. The Turkish military is synonymous with Turkish national 
identity.212  
Thus, there is a wide convergence between the self-understandings of the 
military and the society. The clues to this convergence can also be found in the 
following statements by İlhan, a former general and ex-president of the Atatürk 
High Council for Culture, Language and History: 
Characteristics related to the military are bound to make a 
great contribution to the shaping of the culture of a society so unified 
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with its military as ours. The fact that military has all the cultural 
characteristics of the society that it manifests these characteristics and 
that it serves as a center of education for most of those cultural values 
is inevitable, in fact, necessary consequence.213  
The place of military and its values are regarded as so central to the 
Turkish culture that without them, the national unity is bound to collapse: 
If we think of military culture with its historical achievements 
as well as its contemporary impact as separate from the cultural 
whole, then our national culture will lose its unity and identity.214  
The argument that military values and practices constitute a vital element 
in the overall Turkish national identity:  
It is not wrong to say that the militarist values constitute an 
important component of the collective identity of the Turkish society. 
The values that constitute the distinctive color and define the Turkish 
society are mostly in relation with the military and conscription.215  
The strong identification of the Turkish society with its military  finds 
resonance in Turkish politics. For example, in 2002, upon questions about the 
anti-EU expressions of a general, Foreign Minister Sukru Sina Gurel defended the 
role of the military in Turkish political life, saying the armed forces had always 
played a positive role. "The position of the military in Turkish political and social 
life stems from historical experience, and the importance of the armed forces in 
Turkish political and social life cannot be compared with any other armed forces 
in Europe." Gurel said.216  
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The positive identification of the society with the military leads to the 
establishment of a popular trust for the military. “The Turkish military has a good 
reputation in the country”217 According to a poll made in 1998 by TESEV, the 
most trusted government institution was the army (% 94)218. According to a later 
research by the same institution, the percentage fell to 77 % in 2002 219, and rose 
to 8.2 out of 10 in 2004220. The results are supported with the research by 
international institutions like GfK, which depicted the percentage as 91 %221.  
According to the Eurobarometer National Report for Turkey, prepared in 2005, 
the most trusted institution in Turkey is Turkish Armed Forces, with a percentage 
of 86 %. The latest poll, made by Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırma Eğitim ve 
Danışma Merkezi Platformu based in İzmir, indicates that the professional 
credibility of Turkish Armed Forces is approximately 82 %.  
The popular trust for Turkish Armed Forces in Turkey is widely shared in 
different segments of the society. The Istanbul city-dwellers222, the members of 
Ankara Trade Chamber,223 the university professors224 and even supporters of the 
Justice and Development Party living in rural areas 225 think that the Turkish 
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Armed Forces is the most dependable institution in Turkey. While it may be 
argued that the popular trust for government has also risen significantly over the 
last five years226, and that the armed forces tend to be the most trusted institution 
in most countries227 the level of trust among the Turkish society for the army is 
high above the levels expected in a country where military took direct control of 
government twice before and remained active in the political discussions over a 
quarter century of democratic rule.  
The level of convergence between the self-understandings of the military 
and society on the one side, and popular trust for the Turkish Armed Forces on 
the other, are often regarded as a strong indicator of the level of militarization of 
society228  According to this argument, the Turkish society has gone through a 
militarization process from the establishment of the Republic. During the efforts 
for nation-building, the state indoctrinated the public with a special concept of 
citizenship, which was generally interwoven with myths of martyrdom and self-
sacrifice, love and responsibility for the motherland, protecting home country 
against the enemies, which led to the sanctification of the military in general.  
The institution of a “citizen army” usually based on universal 
male conscription has defined the nation at birth as a military nation. 
Military service provides one of the most important sites where the 
nation idea is married to the state idea naturalizing the connection 
between the two. A state protected by a national army or citizen 
soldiers can be the tip of the iceberg concealing state idea being 
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protected by the nation-idea229  
Nevertheless, it would be mistaken to state that the militarization process 
–if there is any, began with the establishment of the Republic or it was totally 
controlled by the state and/or the military elite. Militarization is defined as  
…a step by step process by which a person or a thing 
gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend 
for its well being on militaristic ideas.230  
Therefore, the process of militarization is not just a power exercise by the 
military, at the end of which the military is able to control the whole society. 
During the process, militaristic ideas and the importance of the military may be 
voluntarily internalized by the society, which may lead to the attribution of a 
special role to the armed forces by the society. Therefore, militarization may exist 
as the outcome of the society’s own necessities and its perception of its own well-
being. Moreover, even if the process had been successfully supervised by the 
state and military elite as a one-way indoctrination, the military-related myths, 
rituals within Turkish culture, the underlying basis which is proven to be eligible 
for “militarization” should be analyzed in order to understand why militarization 
has been so successful in the first place. The following part in this chapter 
elaborates on these elements. 
6.1.2. Mass Conscription and Military Culture in Turkey  
It is often stated that the mass conscription is the main reason as to why 
the Turkish culture is interwoven with military culture. Kinzer depicts the picture 
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as follows: 
All young Turkish men must serve in the army, which means 
that virtually every adult male is a veteran and that most families have 
had the experience of seeing sons in uniform. Turks do not fear their 
army or consider it oppressive the way terrified Africans and Latin 
Americans did when cruel military dictatorships dominated their 
societies. Most see it as a benevolent force that has successfully 
defended Turkey against foreign and domestic enemies and that truly 
has the national interest at heart. In much of Turkish society there is a 
desire to believe the best about the armed forces and their 
commanders.231  
Every male Turk over 20 with appropriate health condition is bound to 
serve in the military through a period ranging from 5 to 15 months. According to 
the Turkish constitution, military service is regarded both as a duty and a right of 
the citizen. Although it is hard to deny the enormous influence of mass 
conscription on overall Turkish society, it should be noted that the military 
service is not regarded as an unpleasant, involuntary service.232 It is called as 
vatani görev (duty for the motherland), vatan hizmeti (service for the motherland), 
or vatan borcu (debt to the motherland) both in the media and the public.  
Military service is regarded as a step for being grown up, a test of 
masculinity and indicator of eligibility for marriage. Therefore, before the 
conscript departs for his regiment some ceremonies are held with great 
celebrations. Mostly, the young males around the same age in the neighborhood 
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gather at the homes of relatives or neighbors for the dinner and they chat, sing, 
and dance. On the day of departure, friends and relatives accompany the conscript 
to the train station or bus station233. They hug, kiss, and make some jokes like 
throwing him up in the air and say ‘En büyük asker, bizim asker!’ (the greatest 
soldier is ours).  
Having completed the military service is regarded so important among the 
society that those whose health is not eligible for the military service, may try to 
conceal their health condition: “…since in Turkish society, military service is 
perceived as a national duty and part of masculine identity, so this perception may 
induce many citizens not to disclose their health problems and try to get 
themselves conscripted as healthy individuals.” 234 For those with disabilities or 
serious illnesses, separate symbolic ceremonies are held in the regiments, where 
they wear uniforms and make oath. This is called temsili askerlik (figurative 
military service). 235   
 Apart from the military service, the concepts of gazi (veteran) and şehit 
(martry) has special connotations in Turkish culture. Gazi originates from the 
Arabic word, gaza (war), and refers to those who took part in war, while şehit 
originates from şehadet (witness), referring to the one who sees. According to the 
Islamic faith, the martyr will directly go to the heaven. It is believed that the 
                                                
233Varoğlu and Bicaksiz, 585 
234
 S. Ceylan S. Kılıç M Hasde, T. Kır “Determination of the Reasons for Unfitness for Military 
Service in Turkey” cited in Varoglu and Bicaksiz, 586 
235
  These ceremonies are widely covered in the media. For an example see “They became a 
soldier for one day” available at 
http://www.kenthaber.com/Arsiv/Haberler/2006/Mayis/11/Haber_137334.aspx (last accessed on 
21 August 2007) 
 121
matrydom is the highest spiritual status, following the prophet, hence the low 
level of risk aversion, reflected in the saying: “Ölürsem şehit, kalırsam gazi 
olurum.” ( If I die [in the war] I will be a matry, if not I will be a veteran). Beside, 
the military is known as peygamber ocağı, (the Prophet’s house)236. As such, the 
societal support for the military is grounded also in the religious motifs of the 
Turkish culture. Moreover, the memories of İstiklal Savaşı, Korean War and 
Cyprus Peace Operation are still alive in the society and the veterans head the 
official corteges in the national days.  Each year, 19th of September is officially 
celebrated as Veterans’ Day. 
6.2. SOCIAL INTERACTION 
6.2.1. Military and the Civil Society 
It is often argued that there is direct relationship between the civil society 
and the “civic consciousness” of the society as opposed to militaristic and/or 
state-centric worldview. Thus, it is expected that there is an inverse relationship 
between the number and effectiveness of the civil society organizations and the 
political power of the military.  
In Turkey, military interventions of 1960, 1971 and 1980 had a disturbing 
effect for civil society organizations.237 Nevertheless, by 1990s civil society 
gained a new momentum, especially after some amendments were made as to the 
provisions of Turkish Penal Code and the Constitution which restricted the 
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establishment and activities of civil society organizations.  During this period, 
although the relationship between security forces, especially military and civil 
society organizations (especially those which focus on human rights) retained its 
thorny nature,  some civil society organizations began to emerge which had a 
constructive relationship with the Turkish military. Turkish Armed Forces has 
been able to establish institutional connections with non-governmental 
organizations, universities and think-tanks.  
Currently, there are six foundations which are officially supported by the 
Turkish General Staff. The links to these foundations can be found on the opening 
page of Turkish General Staff’s website. These are Foundation for Empowerment 
of Turkish Armed Forces, Turkish Armed Forces Education Foundation, Turkish 
Armed Forces Mehmetçik Foundation, Turkish Armed Forces Hand-in-Hand 
Foundation, Turkish Armed Forces Solidarity Foundation, Turkish Armed Forces 
Health Foundation. Boards of Trustees and general directors of these foundations 
are composed of almost exclusively serving or retired military officers.  
Turkish Armed Forces Foundation is established in 1987. Its mission is 
stated as to contribute to the empowerment of the Turkish Armed Forces and 
development of national defense industry with the material and moral support of 
the Turkish society.238 It has a great number of contributors, who donates money 
and real estate. It has Honorary Support Councils in 65 cities and  609 districts, 
generally headed by governors.  
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Established in 1982, the Mehmetçik Foundation is another civil society 
organization which enjoys a wide range of support from the society. Mehmetçik is 
the general name traditionally given by Turkish society to soldiers. The mission 
of the Foundation is stated as “to provide “Death and Disabled Pension” for 
Mehmetçiks and their families, to provide “Continuous Education Aid” for their 
children, to provide “Continuous Care Aid” for disabled war veterans, to organize 
social programs to bring together Mehmetçiks in the Aid Plans, their families and 
the donators.”239 The foundation’s main financial sources are donations and 
revenues from its subsidiaries. Since 1982, it paid nearly 80 Million USD 
assistance to approximately 28.000 people according to the Aid Plans and still 
pays 1 Million USD each month to 5.500 people according to the Aid Plan.  
Turkish Armed Forces Education foundation is establishes in 1957 with 
the aim of supporting education of the children of officers, veterans and martyrs. 
It has 17 dormitories in 8 cities and provides scholarships. Besides, it is argued 
that it will establish a private university, which will reserve quotas for children of 
veterans and martyrs.240  
Apart from these foundations, there are four military-originated 
associations, which have direct links with the Turkish Armed Forces.  These are 
Turkey Combatant Veterans Association, Turkey War Veterans, Martyrs, and 
Their Widows and Orphans Association, Turkey Retired Officers Association, 
and Turkey Retired Non Commissioned Officers Association. 
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These foundations and associations help to establish and strengthen the 
social links between the Turkish Armed Forces and the society. The amount of 
donations they receive and their wide range of activities can be perceived as both 
strong indicators of the societal support they receive from the Turkish society and 
effective instruments of maintaining such support. 
There are other civil society organizations which are allegedly identified 
with Turkish Armed Forces. 241 Among them, Ataürkçü Düşünce Derneği 
(Atatürkist Thought Association), headed by an ex-general Şener Eruygur, has 
been on the forefront of recent public discussions on regime and secularism. The 
association organized a series of meetings in order to protest the expected 
presidential candidacy of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (the prime minister and 
President of Justice and Development Party). Hundreds of thousands gathered in 
the separate meetings organized in Ankara, İstanbul, İzmir. These meetings were 
widely covered in the national and international media. At the same time with the 
meetings, the General Chief of Staff issued a declaration which stated that "It 
should not be forgotten that the Turkish armed forces is one of the sides in this 
debate and the absolute defender of secularism." The fact that that the head of 
ADD is a former general, the parallelism between the ideologies of ADD and 
Turkish Armed Forces and the slogans chanted in the meetings in favor of the 
military like “Orduya uzanan eller kırılsın.” “Mustafa Kemal’in askerleriyiz” and 
“En büyük asker bizim asker”242 lead to the allegations that these meetings were 
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organized with the support of or to support the military. Although there is no 
direct relationship with these organizations and the Turkish Armed Forces, these 
meetings indicate that while the society presents their anxieties about the future of 
the country it refers to the military as “the guardian of the regime”243.  
Along with the informal bonds as stated above, Turkish Armed Forces has 
also established formal institutional links with civilian bureaucracy and wider 
public through think-tanks and educational institutions. Among them National 
Security Academy plays an important role in developing relations between the 
Turkish Armed Forces and different segments of the civilian population.  
National Security Academy was established in 1952 as “National Defense 
Academy”. Since 1964, it functions, except for a short interval in 1981-82, as 
National Security Academy, a govermental institution which provides graduate-
level education to serving or potential high ranking bureaucrats working in 
different institutions of state, including Turkish Armed Forces, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Internal Affairs. Its mission is stated as to endow 
high level bureaucrats in public institutions and military officers with planning 
and information skills in issues concerning national security and to enhance the 
spirit of cooperation and coordination between the civilian and military 
frequenters (müdavim) of the academy.244 Recently, civilian employees from the 
private sector (mostly from media and civil society organizations) began to be 
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accepted to the academy. While the military frequenters are determined by the 
General Staff, the civilian frequenters are elected by the State Personnel Office 
upon approval by the Prime Ministry. 245 Although the academy operates under 
the umbrella of the General Secretariat of NSC, the academy is formally linked to 
the Command of the Turkish Staff Officers' School.   
Each frequenter takes a five-month long education from distinguished 
scholars and military and civilian experts. The curricula consists of issues 
concerning global and national security, protection of the national interests, 
determination and evaluation of national power, crises management, preparing 
criteria for war directives and ministerial plans and total defense of the country. 
The academy aims to “bring up disciplined personnel who understand and 
embrace main principles of Ataturkist thought and have a forward-looking view 
based on Turkish national culture, custom and tradition”246 Especially with the 
recent changes in procedures for the accession of civilian people from non-
governmental organizations and the media, the Turkish Armed Forces has been 
able to enhance and strengthen the bond it established with the wider society. It 
serves a unique platform where civilians and military officers discuss, evaluate 
and cooperate on issues concerning national security. 
The Turkish Armed Forces has also intense relationship with think-tanks. 
It is argued ASAM, the first and one of the most prolific institutions that work on 
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security has close collaboration with Turkish Armed Forces, as illustrated in its 
executive cadre.247 The chief executive of ASAM is Edip Başer, a former three-
star general, who worked as vice General Chief of Staff.   In 2002, Turkish Armed 
Forces has inaugurated its own think-tank, Stratejik Araştırmalar ve Etüd Merkezi 
(Study Center for Strategic Research) (SAREM)248 under the auspices of General 
Chief of Staff. The institution organizes conferences and works with several 
civilian scholars in issues concerning Turkey’s national security needs249. As 
such, it establishes channels of communication and understanding as well as a 
platform for collaboration between the Turkish Armed Forces and the public. 
6.2.2. Turkish Armed Forces’ Supportive Activities for Social 
Development 
One of the most effective links that establishes a strong bond of trust 
between the society and the Turkish Armed Forces is their social development 
support activities. The ground for these activities is set as “to provide for the 
integration of the society and the Turkish Armed Forces, which comes from the 
bosom of the Turkish Republic and is the apple of its eyes; to set clearly that 
Turkish Armed Forces is always on the public’s side, to endear the Turkish 
Armed Forces and the state and enhance the public trust for them.”250 This 
mission is in line with one of the primary duties of the Land Forces, as indicated 
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in the website: “to familiarize Land Forces and enhance the bond between the 
Land Forces and the public.”251 
The support activities of Turkish Armed Forces are carried out by each 
segment of the armed forces, including the Gendarmerie and Coastal Guard. 
These activities are widely publicized in the local and national media.252 They 
include a wide range of areas including education, health, environment, sports and 
arts, disaster relief, visits, and infrastructure.  
Most of these activities are directed mostly to rural areas in order to 
enhance the public services, like health and education. The military officers detect 
the problems through speaking to the local people and then plan these 
activities253. Usually, the military repairs school buildings and their landscape, 
donates books and stationary goods. In 2006, free preparation classes for 
university entrance examination are offered for about 2000 students in Mehmetcik 
Dershaneleri.254  Foreign language and computing courses are opened. Moreover, 
campaigns are organized in order to encourage military officers to undertake the 
education expenses of poor children.255 The Turkish Armed Forces regularly 
opens literacy courses and professional courses for conscript soldiers. In these 
courses, between 2000 and 2007, 142.972 soldiers gained literacy and around 
500.000 soldiers acquired professional skills for earning their lives after military 
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service.256 
Turkish Armed Forces also make sanitary inspections in rural areas where 
health services are inadequate. They repair village clinics and lodgments. The 
military offers free treatment, medicine and counseling. Moreover, sanitary 
measurements are carried out in military laboratories to fight against epidemics 
along with food control and water analysis. They organize conferences on birth 
control, parenting and other health issues. At times, military equipments are used 
for transportation of patients and of organs for transplantation257.  
Turkish Armed Forces support activities for social development also 
include sports and art competitions, music concerts, conferences on 
environmental protection, women’s and human rights, forestation campaigns, 
visits to asylums for the aged and orphanages, and reparation of infrastructure like 
electricity, roads and water utilities. 
Turkish Armed Forces has also duties in disaster relief. They take part in 
fire fighting and have relief and recover functions after flood and earthquakes. 
Due to its well-organized manpower and efficiency, Turkish Armed Forces is able 
to reach to the disaster area with utmost competence. Especially, the services dealt 
out by the military after the major Marmara earthquake of 1999, has been quite 
appreciated by the society. The Turkish Armed Forces was the first to reach the 
seriously affected zones. A poll made by scholars in the Adapazari district in the 
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aftermath of the earthquake indicates that most of the respondents think that the 
Turkish Armed Forces has been the second major provider of support after the 
relatives and neighbors.258  
The planning and efficiency of the Turkish Armed Forces on disasters is 
so appreciated that well-known seismologists Ahmet Mete Işıkara259 and Celal 
Şengör260 stated that the Turkish military is fully prepared to any major 
earthquake that would take place in İstanbul. Following these statements, the 
discussions took place in the media where it is argued that full management of 
crises, especially earthquakes, should be undertaken by the military rather than 
governorship.261  
The head of Association in Support of Contemporary Living, Turkan 
Saylan: “In Turkey, we do not fight only against PKK. Our army, like a civil 
society organization, helps in our activities. When an earthquake or flood takes 
place, we look to the army for help. Accordingly, we cannot say [to them] ‘Stand 
aside.”262 The contribution of supportive activities by the military to the 
establishment and maintenance of the close relationship between the society and 
                                                
258
 M. Cüneyt Birkök, Cemal Eroğlu “17 Ağustos Marmara Depremi Sonrasında Sosyal Yapı 
Problemleri: Bilişim Ölçekleriyle Sosyolojik Değerlendirmeler” (“Social Structure Problems after 
The August 17 Marmara Earthquake: Sociological Evaluations with Information System Scales”) 
Uluslararası İnsan Bilimleri Dergisil 1, no.1, (2002):13 
259
 “Askerler Marmara Depremine Hazırlanıyor” (Soldier is preparing to Marmara 
Earthquake”),Voice of Anatolia, available at http://www.voanews.com/turkish/archive/2004-06/a-
2004-06-18-15-1.cfm; “TSK'dan deprem taburları” (“Earthquake troops from the Turkish Armed 
Forces”), CNNTURK, available at 
http://www.cnnturk.com/OZEL_DOSYALAR/haber_detay.asp?pid=1100&haberid=118282 16 
(last accessed on 2 September 2007) 
260
 Hurriyet, “Asker hazır, siviller değil”(Soldier is ready but civilians are not”), August 3, 2004 
261
 “Deprem Dede bu kez mimberden seslendi” NTVMSNBC (“This time, Deprem Dede 
addressed from the pulpit”) August 18, 2007 available at 
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/417576.asp (last accessed on 1 September 2007) 
262
 Tempo, April 26,2007 available at http://www.tempodergisi.com.tr/toplum_politika/13847/ 
(last accessed on 1 September 2007) 
 131
the army and the projection of this bond into Turkish civil-military relations, is 
well-stated by columnist Can Dündar:  
“In the aftermath of the flood disaster where 40 lives 
are lost, if the military hums and rescues the water bound 
people, while the Prime Minister states that “They exaggerate. 
That is natural disaster… when it comes, these things happen.”, 
if the general who dispenses food in military tents is applauded, 
while the local governor who goes bush for three days is booed, 
and if non-uniformed soldiers collect rubbish while the 
municipalities have their hand tied by the government, then we 
cannot establish trust for the civilian government, neither shall 
we be shocked by the fact that the military is the most trusted 
institution, nor can we persuade the masses who live with the 
hope of a military takeover of the indispensability of the 
democracy.”263  
6.3. DISCURSIVE PRACTICES 
The last argument of this chapter is that the public speeches of the military 
in Turkey are formulated as a response to anxieties of the society about the 
political and social transformations that take place in the country. Society’s strong 
identification with Turkish Armed Forces on the one side and the bond of trust 
(whose dynamics are explained above) on the other side makes it possible for 
Turkish Armed Forces to respond the anxieties and expectations of the society in 
a manner similar to political parties. Turkish Armed Forces acts almost as a 
political party, whose policies and activities reflect the hopes and anxieties of the 
society with a consideration to maintain and augment the support that it receives 
from the society. This cycle is at the core of the Turkish Armed Forces political 
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power.  
In this part, in order to understand the dynamics how and under what 
conditions, the Turkish Armed Forces acts as such, three major areas of dispute in 
the society will be analyzed with particular emphasis on the changes of the public 
opinion and military discourse. It will be argued that the changes show a 
parallelism between public opinion and the military discourse, illustrating that the 
military discourse is ultimately responsive to the changes in the public opinion. 
As such, the military acts as a political party, which shows a particular concern 
for society’s anxieties and expectations.  
Three areas of dispute are chosen from among the subjects where military 
voices are mostly heard. These are Turkey’s EU membership; terrorism and 
Cross-border operations to Northern Iraq and debates on threats to secular regime 
and Ataturk’s reforms. I will argue that the military has always been sensitive to 
the public opinion and there is a strong parallelism between the two.  
6.3.1. EU Accession Process and the Changing Discourses of the 
Military 
The biggest political challenge that Turkey faces is accession process to 
the EU. The accession process brings about redefinitions of certain values like 
democracy and Turkish identity, along with some institutional and legal changes. 
Whether or not the society supports accession process, discussions are inevitable. 
Not infrequently, Turkish Armed Forces, which is supposed to be politically 
neutral in such discussions, become parties to them.  
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Turkey was recognized as a candidate state for EU membership during the 
European Council Helsinki Summit in 1999. Like every candidate state, Turkey 
was supposed to satisfy some several conditions, known as Copenhagen criteria. 
One specific EU requirement for Turkey was the removal of the supremacy of the 
military over civilian politics and placing civilian control of the military in line 
with other EU member states.264 Constitutional amendments have been made 
regarding the place of NSC in Turkish political system.265 The Turkish Armed 
Forces has accepted loss of power vis-à-vis other political actors without too 
much dissent.266 Following the 2004 Regular Report’s confirmation that Turkey 
has been able to strengthen civilian control and has reduced the powers of the 
military, EU started accession process with Turkey in October 2005.  
Sarıgil argues that military finally accepted the reforms which eventually 
would curb its political power, because it “has found itself rhetorically entrapped 
and could not reject reforms”267. The reason for the military’s entrapment is 
Turkish military’s “concern about the negative impact of such an action on the 
military’s legitimacy and credibility in the society”.268 As the harbinger of 
modernization in the early days of the Republic and the institution which 
demonstrates an extensive concern for the Westernization ideal of Atatürk, the 
Turkish Armed Forces has always displayed a supportive stance towards Turkey’s 
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EU bid.269 In a speech in 2003, General Büyükanıt, then vice general chief of 
staff, clearly set the Turkish Armed Forces’ support for EU accession process as 
follows:  
“I openly express: the Turkish Armed Forces is not and 
cannot be anti-EU because EU accession is a geo-strategic and 
geopolitical necessity of the modernization goal set by Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk. This necessity fully overlaps with Turkey’s 
social, political, economic and security goals.  EU cause cannot 
click with anachronistic and separatist objectives of those who 
have different views on Turkey’s unitary structure and secular 
regime.”270  
He further added that Turkey is part of Europe and will accede to 
European Union.  
“Even though what I have said may contradict with the 
expectations of some circles, it is a clear expression of Turkey’s 
and Turkish Armed Forces’ decisive determination. It is a clear 
response to those circles which present Turkish Armed Forces as 
the reason of all negative developments on all occasions.”271   
Apart from the ideological reasons (Westernization), the military’s 
supportive stance has also been backed up by Turkish public whose attitude is 
demonstrated in  several polls made on Turkey’s EU membership since 1999 
Helsinki summit. In a poll made by Piar-Gallup in August 2000, 68.7 % of the 
respondents thought that Turkey should accede to EU, while only 9.9 % thought it 
should not, with remaining 21.4 % defining themselves as unknowledgeable about 
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the issue272. Among the reasons as to why Turkey should not accede to EU, the 
respondents have thought that it will negatively affect the Islamic and national 
identity of Turkey, Turkey’s economy will be too dependent on European 
economy, and that the conditions set for Turkey will harm the territorial integrity 
of Turkey.  Another poll made by TESEV in 2002, confirms these results.273 
While 64 % of the respondents approve of Turkey’s accession, 42 % thought that 
EU membership will bring positive changes to their lives. Those who did not 
favor EU membership stated that religious and national identity of Turkey would 
be weakened. The research concluded that public opinion, although highly 
sensitive in matters concerning national defense and religious/national values, is 
ready for integration with EU in most areas.    
These anxieties and expectations, notwithstanding overall positive 
tendency for membership, were also shared by some in the military circles. At a 
conference at Istanbul’s War Academies Command, NSC Secretary-General Gen. 
Tuncer Kılınç stated that the European Union had never supported Turkey on 
issues concerning Turkey’s national interest, adding that Turkey should seek out 
new alliances other then the EU, such as Iran and Russia. After the remarks, the 
Turkish General Staff refrained form making comments on Kılınç’s statements, 
which was interpreted as the view expressed had supporters in the military circles. 
On the other hand, according to the statements by an anonymous source from the 
Turkish General Staff, Kılınç was interpreted as expressing his own personal 
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opinion in an academic atmosphere, and his views did not represent official view 
of Turkish Armed Forces on EU.274 Later, Kılınç himself stated that he was 
speculating on a scenario and certainly not anti-EU.275 Columnist Murat Yetkin, 
summarized official view of Turkish Armed Forces on EU as follows:   
a. EU should demonstrate adequate understanding to 
Turkey national sensitivities and interests.    
b. Turkey’s EU membership should be perceived as a 
self-respecting togetherness on equal grounds rather than 
unconditional submission.  
c. Nevertheless, Turkey’s interests are membership to 
NATO, OSCE and EU, that is a geopolitical necessity.276   
Despite the divergence of views, the Turkish Armed Forces has stood 
firmly in its support for Turkey’s EU bid while public support for EU has reached 
its peak in 2004. According to transatlantic trends report, there was strong support 
in Turkey in for joining the EU in 2004. 73 % of the respondents believed that it 
would be a good thing for Turkey to join the EU.277 Another poll, Eurobarometer, 
also demonstrated similar results. 71 % of the respondents stated that EU 
membership will be good, with only 9 % stating that it will be bad.278 During an 
interview to a newspaper, General Chief of Staff, Ozkok, declared that “I am the 
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head of Turkish Armed Forces and as the one who represents it, I emphasize that 
we always support the EU membership and the reforms that were made.” Even, 
he argued that the problems over Aegean Sea and the other problems could be 
resolved in a week if Turkey takes steps toward membership. He added that they 
(Turkish Armed Forces) do not have any pre-conditions concerning the EU 
membership, which, Turkish Armed Forces believes, would strengthen social 
state, hasten economic development, and improve life standard and quality. 279 
Ozkok also acknowledged that “EU membership is a public demand.” 280 
 The parallelism between the public opinion and the military discourses 
has continued as the public support for EU membership has begun to decrease. 
Due to the problem over Cyprus, the adoption of laws on “Armenian genocide” in 
several European states, along with the alleged support of some EU countries to 
PKK and DHKP-C, the support of Turkish public for EU membership has begun 
to deteriorate.281 It shrunk to 63 % in 2005282 and to 54 % in 2006283 and to 40 % 
with a dramatic decline in 2007.284 This alienation trend has also been confirmed 
by Eurobarometer Reports; the percentage of Turkish people who think “EU 
membership will be a good thing for Turkey” decreased from 71 % in 2004 to 
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44% in spring 2006. It reached to 52 % with only a slight increase in spring 2007, 
while the percentage of those who think “EU membership is a bad thing” almost 
tripled from 2004 (9 %) to 2006 (25 %). Besides, the public trust for EU 
institutions has also decreased from to 51 % in autumn 2004285 to 38 % in spring 
2007. 
Despite the legal and institutional changes and the efforts undertaken by 
the government, the society’s attraction towards EU membership has showed a 
continuous decrease. According to the polls, the Turkish public’s top anxieties 
about EU membership were “less use of Turkish language” (62 %)“ increase in 
the use and illegal trafficking of drugs” (62 %) and “Loss of national identity and 
culture” (58 %).286  
At the same time, Turkish Armed Forces has began to display a cautious 
stance towards the developments, usually pronouncing the doubts and anxieties of 
the groups in the wider society about the concessions demanded from Turkey by 
the EU. These issues included but not confined to rights of minorities and the 
Cyprus question.  While the top-cadres of the Armed Forces denied any reference 
to the Army as being anti-EU, they did not refrain from criticizing the EU 
countries and the representatives.287 In 2005, in an interview, former chief of 
general staff (retired) General Kıvrıkoğlu, states that  
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“Turkey’s territorial and national integrity should not be 
put in jeopardy...Europe should be sincere about this subject and it 
should not have double standards. It appears that EU gives orders 
and Turkey obeys.  EU’s double standards lead to the impression 
that EU would like to direct Turkey towards a position between 
Lausanne and Sevres Treaty.”   
Furthermore, he points to the gravest concern as “EU’s support for 
Kurdish nationalism” referring to the EU demands on giving cultural rights to 
Kurdish people. “EU always says ‘Kurd, Kurdish…education in Kurdish’. If 
Kurdish becomes the media of education, what shall be the unitary structure, the 
national integrity?  Turkey’s structure would decompose”.  
He further adds that the accession process should be carefully managed 
since “there is no end to these demands. When one step is made, another demand 
comes… Today they say that Kurds should also be counted as constituent nation 
in the Constitution. Then will come autonomy, federative system, etc… What all 
these mean is Turkey will fall apart.”288  
In November 2006, following the criticisms of Hansjörg Kretschmer, the 
EU Commission’s representative to Ankara, about the weight of military on 
Turkish politics and in response to his remarks on giving cultural rights to Kurds, 
Chief of General Staff, Gen. Büyükanıt criticized the EU and stated that “We 
have to be sensitive; they are trying to create minorities.” He also added that “The 
army is their [the EU's] target. Why are they picking on the army? Why are they 
bothered by the public statements of the military?... Do the statements perturb the 
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goals of their secret agendas?”289  Büyükanıt also urged the EU officials to speak 
more carefully: “Every country has its realities. The security situation must be 
very well evaluated. Turkey is located in a very sensitive region, in terms of 
geopolitics. ... We all have to be careful [in our criticism].”290  
During the same speech, delivered in War Academies Command, 
Buyukanıt did not refrain from criticizing some European Union countries on 
their attitude towards PKK and harshly criticized them for not supporting 
Turkey’s fight against terrorism despite the agreements. 291 
All these public statements by the military lead to the assessments by 
public opinion holders that Turkish military has developed serious doubts and 
very deep anxieties about the EU accession process.292 The parallelism between 
Turkish public opinion and the military discourse indicates that Turkish military 
is responsive to the anxieties of the Turkish public, and formulate their speeches 
as a response the general tendencies that impinge on the Turkish society.  
6.3.2. Terrorism and Military Discourses on Cross-border Operations 
Since 1980s, terrorism has been the major subject of debate and concern 
among the Turkish society. The separatist ethnic nationalism of PKK and the 
problems regarding the southeast has triggered the traditional anxieties of the 
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Turkish society about the territorial and national integrity of the state. 
With the arrest and detention of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, 
these anxieties has diminished due to reduced number of terrorist attacks and 
casualties. In the meantime, while armed conflict has declined, it became possible 
to grant some cultural rights to Kurds without too much dissent. In 2002, as part 
of legal and institutional reforms which aimed at integration with EU, some 
enactments were made allowing radio and television broadcasts in Kurdish as 
well as the option of private Kurdish education.  
In these circumstances, the US demanded permission from Turkish 
government for the deployment and transfer of US forces through Turkish soil 
shortly before the Iraq War. During the negotiations between the Turkish and the 
US government, the option of sending Turkish troops to Iraq has also begun to be 
debated. The main reason behind the proposal to deploy Turkish troops to Iraq 
was to avoid being surprised by the establishment of an independent Kurdish state 
next to Turkey’s borders. The government was also planning to prevent the PKK 
from exploiting the likely atmosphere of turmoil in the northern Iraq  
.According to Turkish constitution; the Turkish government is required to 
get permission from the Turkish parliament for both sending Turkish troops to 
abroad and allowing foreign troops presence on Turkish territory. Both requests 
were formulated in the same bill, and presented to the parliament on 1 March 
2003, hence “1 March Resolution”. The resolution bill has received 264 approvals 
as opposed to 250 rejecting and 19 abstaining votes. Nevertheless, it could not 
 142
reach the constitutional majority of 276 and eventually was turned down.  
The rejection of the bill was a surprise to ruling AKP, who had 361 chairs. 
97 AKP MPs said “no” to the bill along with opposition MPs despite the 
government’s attitude. It is argued that these MPs have said “no” due to public 
opposition. According to polls, 92 % of the population was against an operation to 
Iraq.293 The 91.2 % of the 1819 respondents have answered the question of “To 
what degree would you support the US operation to Iraq” as “I would never”, 
while those who said “ I would” remained 4.1 %. When respondents are asked “If 
a military operation takes place, to what degree would you support Turkey’s 
cooperation with the US?” 82.8 % answered “I would not”. The population’s 
opposition was also apparent in public protests. Meetings were organized at the 
day of balloting with over 50.000 participants in order to protest the US operation 
and prevent the approval of the bill.294  
The public debates have evolved around three cores. First of all, Turkish 
public opinion about the legitimacy of such a war and Turkey’s cooperation with 
the US was negative. Secondly, the public was doubtful about the consequences 
of the deployment of foreign troops on Turkish soil. And finally, there was strong 
opposition to the transfer of Turkish troops. 
While most of the public opinion was negative, the military is not involved 
in these discussions and remained silent. It is argued that the Prime Minister 
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deliberately postponed the day of balloting to 1st of March in order to obtain a 
loud approval of the bill by the NSC, which would convene at the end of 
February.295 Although NSC made a press release after the meeting, it was not as 
supportive as the government demanded.296 Four years later in a TV program, the 
Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that it was a mistake of the assembly to reject the 
bill. Ironically, he criticized the General Chief of Staff and the Force 
Commanders for not publicly pronouncing their support for the bill even though 
they were fully supportive of it.297  Later, the military circles have also declared 
that they were really supporting the bill.298  
With the increase in terrorist attacks and casualties in the Turkey’s 
southeast, the debates on the necessity of a Cross-border operation in Northern 
Iraq has been renewed. In 2003, while only 5% of the population thought that 
“PKK and Southeastern issue” as the most serious problem,299 in fall 2004, those 
who thought terrorism is one of the top problems of the country was 18 % of the 
population.300 In spring 2005 it has risen to 29%.301 By fall 2006, more than half 
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of the respondents thought that (52%) terrorism is one of the gravest problems.302 
Similarly, a recent poll named “Research on Turkish people’s attitude towards 
PKK and Terrorism -Crossborder operation and Northern Iraq- made in June 
2007, illustrates that 84 % said that they would “support a military intervention in 
Iraq by Turkish Armed Forces to prevent PKK terrorism”.303  
While the public opinion on a possible cross-border operation have 
changed, the top echelons of the military, who refrained from making statements 
about the 1 March Resolution, have decided to make open statements about the 
emergency of the problem and pointed to the need to make a cross-border 
operation to Northern Iraq. In a press conference on 12 April 2007, General Chief 
of Staff Gen. Büyükanıt, stated that  
 “You may ask me this question: Should an operation 
me made in Northern Iraq? Yes, it should be. There are two 
dimensions to the issue. First of all, when I look from a military 
perspective, yes it should be made. Would it be effective? Yes it 
would. Second dimension is political. Political decision is 
required for a cross border operation. Turkish Armed Forces has 
exceeding power to do that when lawfully assigned such a task.” 
304
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has also been reflected in public protests against terrorism. On 8 June 2007, The 
General Chief of Staff released a 7-article press declaration, which pointed to the 
recent increase in the terrorist activities and appealed to the public “to show a 
massive opposition reflex” against these terrorist activities.305 Shortly after the 
declaration, the Turkey’s most active civil society organizations like Çağdaş 
Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği, Çağdaş Eğitim Vakfı, Ulusal Sivil Toplum 
Kuruluşları Birliği, Türk Kadınlar Birliği and Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği 
responded to the military’s appeal by organizing simultaneous anti-terrorism 
meetings in İstanbul, İzmir, Ankara and Bursa on 23 June 2007. Several meetings 
are also held in other cities with the support of local non-governmental 
organizations. 306 It is argued that the declaration by the General Chief of Staff is 
the outcome of the pressure by the society about the increase in deaths and it 
simply vocalizes public anxieties, rather than an incitement by the military.307  
6.3.3. Republican Meetings and e-Coup of 27 April 
Another issue which Turkish Armed Forces attaches utmost importance is 
the protection and maintenance of secular regime, set according to Ataturkist 
principles.308 Especially since 28 February 1998, when pro-Islamist Erbakan 
government has been replaced by Çiller government due to pressures form the 
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military, the regime problem continues. While, between 200 and 2003, where 
ANAP DSP MHP government ruled, the regime discussions was not very much. 
The silence has remained with the election of 2003, where AKP has been the 
single party government. Despite AKP deputies and constituents past record of 
anti- regime activities, the relationship between the government and the military 
was rather smooth. Once, Hilmi Özkök was reported to describe their relationship 
with the government as “like poetry”. Nevertheless, Özkök himself did not refrain 
from pointing to the reactionary Islamist threat several times. When Büyükanıt 
has been elected as the new General Chief of Staff, he also made remarks on the 
issue of threats to the secular character of the regime. On 3 October 2006, he 
stated that there is a grave problem of regressive Islamism.309  
In May 2007, when the term of former President of Republic, Necdet 
Sezer has ended, the regime discussion has acquired a new focus. Since AKP-
dominated parliament would elect a new president, it was more than likely that a 
person with an Islamist past will become president. Due to presidency’s critical 
position concerning duties about national security and his relationship with 
Turkish Armed Forces as the Supreme Command, the Turkish Armed forces has 
always placed utmost importance as to who will be elected as the new president.  
Prime Minister Erdoğan had been eyeing the post himself. But due to 
sustained secular opposition, composed of military, opposition party CHP, 
President Necdet Sezer and masses organized around Kemalist civil society 
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organizations like Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği (Atatürkist Thought Association) 
and Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği (Association in Support of 
Contemporary Life), he did not openly pronounce AKP’s presidential candidate to 
the last moment. On 12 April 2007, President Sezer pointed to the public tension 
arousing from perception of reactionary threat:  
“The reactionary threat which pursued our Republic since its 
establishment like a sinister ghost, leads to anxieties with its 
recent breadth. The activities which target Turkey’s secular 
regime and modern acquisitions of the Republic and the 
endeavors to project religion on political scene aggravate the 
public tensions.”310  
He also added that Turkish political regime is jeopardy in a level as never 
happened before. According to a poll made by newspaper Hurriyet311 57,1 % of 
the Turkish people think that president Sezer is right in his statement that 
Turkey’s regime is in jeopardy. 
After President’s speech, the Turkish General Chief of Staff, Büyükanıt, 
although initially reluctant, became parties to the discussion by saying that  
“Until this time, I have not spoken to anyone about the 
presidential election. The president that will be elected will 
also be Supreme Command of the Turkish Armed Forces. As 
such, the election is of vital interest for Turkish Armed Forces. 
Both as a citizen and as a staff of Turkish Armed Forces, I 
                                                
310
 Hurriyet, “Sezer'in konuşmasının tam metni” (“The whole text of Mr. Sezer’s Speech”) April 
13, 2007 available at  
 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/6329346.asp?gid=0&srid=0&oid=0&l=1 (last accessed on 23 
August 2007) 
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 Hurriyet, “Cumhurbaşkanı bu çıkışı yapmakta haklı mı?” (“Is President right in making such a 
statement?”) April 20, 2007 available at 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/6361160.asp?gid=180 (last accessed on 12 September 2007) 
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hope that a person who embraces Republic’s main principles 
not in word but in essence, will be elected as president.” 312     
Following these speeches, the masses organized around civil society 
organizations prepared a huge meeting with thousands of participants in Ankara 
Tandoğan Square on 14 April 2007.313 in order to protect Republican values, 
secularism and protest Erdoğan’s candidacy. The protesters also chanted some 
slogans in favor of the military: “Orduya uzanan eller kırılsın.” (damn with the 
hands that encroach on army) “Mustafa Kemal’in askerleriyiz” (We are soldiers 
of Mustafa Kemal) and “En büyük asker bizim asker” (Greatest solider is ours).314  
The statements and protests forced Prime Minister Erdogan to nominate 
his foreign minister Abdullah Gül on April 24, as the official candidate of Justice 
and Development Party for the premiership. Gul's candidacy was as controversial 
as Erdoğan’s because of his past involvement with two banned Islamic political 
parties. 
On 27 April, with only 353 parliamentarians present, the AKP failed to 
achieve a quorum of 367 due to protest of the opposition party deputies. Gül's 
candidacy failed at the first round despite a majority of those present voting in 
favor. Due to the lack of necessary participation and several alleged violations of 
the constitution, the vote was taken to the constitutional court to be discussed over 
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 Radikal “Büyükanıt cumhurbaşkanı adayını tarif etti” (“Mr. Büyükanıt described his 
[preferred] presidential candidate”), April 13, 2007  
313
 Milliyet Online News “Ankara'da miting olaysız sona erdi...”, April 14, 2007 available at  
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/04/14/son/sontur07.asp (last accessed on 15 September) 
314
 “Cumhuriyet Mitingine yüzbinler akın etti” (“Hundered of thousands flock to Republican 
Meetings”) available at http://www.haberx.com/n/1011229/cumhuriyet-mitingine-yuzbinler-akin-
etti.htm (last accessed on 24 September 2007)  
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the weekend.315 Later the same day the Turkish Armed Forces released an official 
statement in the official website of the General Staff, which would letter be 
named as e-coup.  
Recently, the problem with the Presidential election 
process has been focused on the subject of discussions about 
secularism. This situation is monitored by Turkish Armed 
Forces with anxiety. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish 
Armed Forces is one of the parties to this [secular versus 
Islamists] debate and is the absolute defender of secularism.316 
The declaration also stressed that when necessary Turkish Armed Forces 
would not refrain from displaying their attitudes and actions very clearly.317  
The reactions to the General Staff’s statement has been twofold. On the 
one side, there were those who stated that General Staff’s declaration has been on 
time and reflect the public anxieties. For example, on 28 April, in another 
meeting, organized by “Turkey Youth Union” in Ankara, university youth has 
chanted slogans like “Army and nation, hand in hand.” Retired General Hurşit 
Tolon, who took part in the meeting, stated that “Turkish Armed Forces’ 
declaration has brought up sensitivities of the Turkish society”318 
On the other side, there was reluctance concerning military’s warning-like 
statement. On 29 April, the second of “Republican Meetings” took place, this 
time in Çağlayan Square in İstanbul.319 320 The organizers of the Çağlayan 
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 Hurriyet, “Meclis'te 368 kişi var iddiası” (“Allegations that there were 368 people in the 
Assembly”) April 27, 2007  
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 “Excerpts of Turkish army statement”  BBC News, available at 
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 “Excerpts of Turkish army statement”  BBC News 
318 Hurriyet, “Cumhuriyet sahipsiz değil” (“The Republic is not forlorn”) April 29, 2007  
319 Sabah, 'Ne şeriat, ne darbe demokratik Türkiye' (“Neither sharia nor coup but democratic 
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meeting stated that in order to avoid being qualified as pro-coup, this time they 
would chant slogans like “No to the Coups”  and “neither sharia nor coup”321. 
Yet, the protesters have been divided on the issue. Some civil society leaders 
presented their support for military’s declaration, like Nur Serter, vice president 
of the Ataturkist Thought Association, who stated that “As a Turkish citizen, as a 
nationalist, I present my gratitude to Turkish Armed Forces”322 while others are 
opposed to references to a possible military intervention.323 The meeting has also 
been regarded as an anti-EU and anti-US protest hence one of the most popular 
slogans “neither EU nor US, but fully independent Turkey”. 
After the election surprise of AKP with gaining 47 % of the votes, some 
comments have been made that the Turkish society has demonstrated its negative 
attitude toward military’s involvement in politics. It may be argued that while 12 
April declaration was in line with the public considerations, the e-coup on 27 
April has been regarded by the society as an excessive move of the military, 
which threatens a more direct intervention. Journalist Metehan Demir points to 
this perception when stating that “In this country, the most trusted institution is 
the military but when it directly intervenes in politics, society reacts to this.”324 It 
appears that the military has understood the message. The first statements by the 
military on the election results were: “The views of Turkish Armed Forces do not 
                                                                                                                                
Turkey”) April 29, 2007 
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change on a daily basis. We are still behind what we said on 12 April.”  But Gen. 
Buyukanıt did not refer to the e-coup and tried to normalize the situation: “Indeed, 
what we said does not include anything abnormal. They were the subjects that 
everybody knew about.” When asked about whether the 27 April declaration has 
affected the election results, he said, “We do not have a research company. Thus, 
without concrete data we cannot say anything. So I cannot answer to this 
question. What I think is that it did not. But it is just based on guess”.325 His and 
force commanders’ later attitude and statements on Abdullah Gul’s second 
nomination and election for presidential post have been relatively cooperative.326 
While Turkish Armed Forces retained their position with respect to the ban on 
headscarf in public space, in line with the will of the people, they agreed to work 
with a lawfully elected president whose legitimacy is unquestionable.327   
Despite the high level of synchronization between the Turkish Armed 
Forces’ statements and the Turkish public opinion, the power that is ascribed to 
military has its limits. The social bond that exists between the Turkish Armed 
Forces and the society is multifaceted and has deep rooted historical and cultural 
sources. Yet, this bond is also dynamic and is based on up-to-date social 
interaction among civilians, military and the society. Turkish society could both 
enhance and curb military’s political power as Buyukanıt acknowledges “Turkey 
is a fully independent, sovereign country. Who did Ataturk get authorization from 
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and established the Turkish Republic? Turkish people. We also get authorization 
from there.”328 
                                                
328
 Turkish Armed Forces  Turkish General Staff, “Chief of General Staff’s Washington Speech,” 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
In this thesis, an answer is tried to be provided to the question: Where 
does the political power of the Turkish Armed Forces emanate from? Based on 
the theories of power, I hypothesized that the Turkish Armed Forces’ political 
power emanates from its relationship with the Turkish society. Due to the current 
lack of interest in ideational sources of political power in current civil-military 
relations theory, a new approach named “military in society” is established. Then, 
I tried to show that the bulk of the political power of the Turkish Armed Forces 
emanates from its relationship with the society, by looking on the historical, 
cultural, social and discursive practices which may lead to a convergence of 
military and society.  
7.1. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
In terms of power theories, I found out that there is wide range of theories 
which speculate on political power. What surprised me was that although power is 
a central concept which is extensively used in studies of sociology, political 
science, civil-military relations, there is not a common definition of what power 
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is, let alone consensus on how it is exercised and its sources of power.   
When I look into power conceptualizations of theories of civil-military 
relations, I realized that the sources of political power of the militaries are 
understudied. Rather, most of these theories focus on struggles of power between 
the civilian elite and the military elite in order to dominate each other in formal 
decision-making processes. Little reference has been made as to the initial sources 
of military’s political power, and when it is made, it was usually about its 
coercive nature, that is their monopoly on the use of violent means, their guns and 
ballots  and the fear-provoking affect of this monopoly on wider society.  
It is rather astounding to see that although consent of the citizenry, and 
their active support underlies the basis upon which all democratic institutions are 
set, society is disregarded in the theories of civil military relations, or at best 
portrayed as an inactive, secondary player, which has minimal influence in both 
enhancing and curbing the political power, especially of the military. Conversely, 
it was mostly portrayed as the victim of military’s power exercises, as the ultimate 
power yielder.  
Looking from the “military in society” approach leads to a reversal of this 
portrayal of the society upside down. The society is theorized as the ultimate 
source of power rather than the victim. The society, like it empowers the civilian 
politicians through its consent apparent in democratic elections, and ascribes them 
a role in realizing its expectations, may also empower the military through 
informal bonds.      
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7.1.2. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
For the Turkish case, the thesis had important implications. It is possible 
that Turkish society sidesteps the civilian politicians in their relations with the 
military. Rather than fully delegating the authority to direct military sector to 
civilian politicians, Turkish society prefers to retain its bonds with the military 
probably as a guarantee against any possible betrayal by the politicians or against 
any other threat which may ruin the country. Recently however, on its path to 
becoming a member to EU, society’s jealousy in retaining this bond seems to 
lessen. The thesis also reveals that despite the high level of synchronization 
between the Turkish Armed Forces’ deeds and statements and the Turkish public 
opinion, the power that the Turkish society ascribed to the military has its limits. 
The social bond that exists between the Turkish Armed Forces and the society is 
multifaceted and has deep rooted historical and cultural sources. Yet, this bond is 
also dynamic and is based on up-to-date social interaction among civilians, 
military and the society. If more competent politicians succeed in establishing a 
bond of trust and identification with the society, and carefully manage the 
transformation process the society faces in its quest for EU, society’s fears and 
anxieties may be trimmed down. Nevertheless, it is evident that the long-term 
pattern of relations between the society and military is hard to change from today 
to tomorrow. 
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